SECURITY
SECURITY
in the Oil Industry
in
National Association of State Energy
Officials
Marty Matheson
General Manager, Pipelines
American Petroleum Institute
August 12, 2002
Significant Changes
Closer cooperation and communications
n
with government agencies
Development of industry security
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guidelines
Long term impact of the new
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relationships: law enforcement and the
Office of Homeland Security
Security Objectives
Energy Assurance
n
Supporting the security of domestic oil and
natural gas assets and operations
Energy Confidence
n
Maintaining the confidence of our customers,
stakeholders and the American public
Energy Responsiveness
n
Partnering with federal, state and local
agencies
President
Office of Science &
Office of Management
Technology Policy Assistant to the President
National Security & Budget
for Economic Affairs
Council
PITAC
National Science & CIO
National Coordinator
Technology Council National
NSTAC Council
for Security,
Economic Council
Infrastructure Protection and
JTRB Counter Terrorism
Infrastructure CIAO DOJ Computer crime/IP
NSIRC Tel Coordination FBI
ISAC
Group
SPACECOM DISA
DOC NTIA
SOLIC
CIAC
PCIS
JTF-CNO DOE OCIP
NSA
DTRA
IOWA
watch
Center FEMA
NIST National Labs
LIWA JCS
JPO
AFCERT CDRG
EPA
FED COOP/COG
PRE-9/11 Critical Infrastructure
Special
Intelligence
Functions
community INFRAGARD
IT ISAC NERC
Protection Organization
OIL & NATURAL GAS
INTERCONNECTIVITY
Upstream
Upstream Inbound Processing Outbound Distribution Marketing
Exploration Pipelines Pipelines
Refining Terminals Retail
Data analysis Trains Trucks
Co-generation Trucking Aviation
Drilling Shipping Barge
Liquefying Distributor Marine
Producing Ports Trading
Storage Industry
Gathering Trading Commercial
Processing Residential
Storage Credit card
Power Water Gas Telecommunications Banking Security Transaction systems
Transportation routes Computer networks Market Partners Shareholders
Suppliers Customers Consumers Contractors Employees Governments
API Security Activities
Coordinating oil industry associations
n
security coalition
Public communications on the adequacy
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of petroleum product supplies
Responding to legislative initiatives
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Government/industry intelligence sharing
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Working with federal agencies; outreach
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to state agencies
Security guidance
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Key API Milestones
Security Guidance Document, Ver. 1,
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approved by API Board of Directors in
March; submitted to DOE in April
API Senior Security Policy Group and
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Infrastructure Security Committees
formed
Submitted comments on OHS alert levels
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in April
Information Sharing
Serving as oil industry security alert
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distribution point -- from
FBI/NIPC/DOE/DOT to hundreds of oil
companies (short term)
Supporting Energy Information
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Sharing & Analysis Center (ISAC),
more robust long term solution
Legislative Recommendations
Legislative:
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FOIA exemption for voluntary and
mandatory information
Liability and antitrust relief for critical
infrastructure protection
Access to law enforcement and
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intelligence information:
Government & industry should work together
to develop a process that ensures the sharing
of relevant information
Security Guidance
Supports common goal to be
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responsible members of the
communities in which we operate
Allows leveraging of resources
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Reduces the likelihood of
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legislative/regulatory solutions
Deterrence
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Guidance Process Cycle
Oil Sector API U.S. DOE in
Segments, Cyber, partnership with Oil,
API Developed Guidance
API
Other Oil Natural Gas,
Associations & Electric
Consolidated
Energy
Lessons Building Sector
Learned & Guidance
Iterative
Experience
Audits
Public Policy Discourse
Inspections U.S. Congress
Training Office of Homeland
Education Security
Industry Usage State & Local Officials
Security Guidance
Guidance by segment for petroleum
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Refining
Pipeline Transportation (Liquids)
Petroleum Products Distribution & Marketing
Oil & Natural Gas Exploration & Production
Marine Transportation
Cyber/IT Infrastructure
Coast Guard driving development of
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Marine standards
ACC developed guidelines for U.S.
n
chemical Industry
Security Guidance - Goals
Guidelines, not standards or recommended
practices
Include principles, management system and
general measures to be taken at various security
alert levels
Allow flexibility based on type, size and location of
facility. No plan needed if company deems it N/A.
Allow companies to develop specific plans and keep
them confidential
Continuously refine/improve guidance as needed
Homeland Security
National Threat Advisory System
Looking to provide context and
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texture to alerts
Five protective conditions*:
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Severe
High
Elevated
Guarded
Low
*with respective countermeasures
OHS Alert System API Comments
API Supports Office of Homeland Security s
Proposed 5 Level Threat Alert System
Provides an effective and consistent
communication tool
Is flexible to adapt for petroleum applications
Will improve ability to reduce vulnerabilities
and respond to threats
Will standardize across Gov t Regulatory
Agencies and reduce inefficiency
OHS Alert System Add l Issues
Need to improve quality and access to
real-time threat intelligence information
Need to improve communications
between facilities and local law
enforcement and FBI
Need to address access to sensitive
information from Gov t Agencies
(i.e. FOIA, Web, RMP data)
Office of Homeland Security
Developing a National Physical Infrastructure
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Protection Plan
Designate priority assets, systems, and infrastructure
Discuss physical protective requirements according to
sector threats, risk assessments, and
human/economic/public confidence/national defense
consequences
Identify infrastructure protection problems and solutions
Will be vetted through Congress, state and local
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governments and private sector prior to
finalization
Due out September 30, 2002
Latest Pipeline Activities
Security guidance document
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distributed to all operators
Worked with the Office of Pipeline
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Safety to define
Critical facilities
Protective measures
Critical Facilities
Viable terrorist target and intelligence
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exists that such targets are being
targeted or release has the potential for
mass casualties or significant impact on
public drinking water for major population
center
Pipeline facility that if destroyed or
n
damaged would interrupt service to a
large number of customers for an
extended period
Critical Facilities
Facility that if damaged or destroyed
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would impair ability to serve installations
critical to national defense
Facility that if damaged or destroyed
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would impair other modes
(transportation, telecom, electric) and
cause major economic disruption
Works In Progress
Drills with a security focus
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Learning from drills
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Focusing on new relationships
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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION:
Kendra L. Martin
API Security Team Leader
American Petroleum Institute
tel. 202-***-****
*******@***.***
www.api.org