P C Control Room

DANIEL J. SHEA, P.C.

**** ******** *****, *******, ** 77008-3213

Telephone: 832-***-**** " Telecopier: 832-***-**** " *******@***.*** DANIEL JOSEPH SHEA

ALSO ADMITTED IN:

MASSACHUSETTS

AND NEW YORK

February 21, 2021

Hon. Kristine L. Svinicki E-file: *****@***.***

Chairman, U.S.N.R.C. and U.S. Mail, First Class

Mail Stop O-16 B33

Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Chairman Svinicki:

Attached is Mr. King’s response of February 17, 2012 to my letter to you of January 25, 2012. Mr. King’s thoughtful response states his appreciation of my goal of a safe nuclear industry. I sincerely appreciate and thank him for his comment in that regard. But, I have perhaps failed to express that concurrent with my concern for a safe industry is my concern for the reputation and survival of the industry and the existential threat to the climate that nuclear power can continue to mitigate. I am no anti-nuke. My support for nuclear energy has a long history. That history now includes my current and unpleasant experience with our sui generis power supply system in Texas that has left us in Houston: cold, powerless, thirsty, unbathed, and in some instances, with flooded buildings and collapsed ceilings.

Turning then to the substance of Mr. King’s response, he states that for both revisions 2 and 3 to NUREG-0711, “the principal regulatory requirement is the same: 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(iii).” He correctly cites § 50.34, to wit, that “. . . requires, in part, that the applicant ‘[p]rovide for Commission review, a control room design that reflects state-of-the art human factor principals prior to control room panels and layouts.’” But § 50.34 makes no distinction between NUREG-0711, Rev. 2 and Rev 3. It merely mentions “state-of-the-art human factors principles . . .” In that regard, I have previously addressed to your staff the differences between Rev. 2 and Rev. 3 that I feel are worth repeating. They follow below, in pertinent part.

“[P]lease understand my interest in task allocation in my previous letter in which I quote NUREG-0711, Rev. 3, that the ‘. . . designer [not the operator/applicant] assigns functions to Personnel and automation . . . such as (1) manual control, (2) fully automatic control and passive self-controlling phenomena, (3) shared operation, (4) operation by consent / delegation or (5) operation by exception. See NUREG-0771, Rev. 3 (2012), p. 27, Exhibit ‘D.’ Compare NUREG-0711 Rev. 2 (2004), Exhibit ‘C,’ p. xiii

‘Assignment of control functions to (1) personnel, (2) system elements, and (3) combinations of the two. . . . Plant safety and reliability are enhanced by exploiting the strengths of personnel and system elements, including improvements that can be

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achieved through assigning control to these elements with overlapping and redundant responsibilities.’ The latter is a very slippery slope.” Clearly, NUREG-0711, Revision 3 provides a nuanced and expanded assignment of functions than Revision 2 which seems to place personnel strengths and system elements on the same level with overlapping and redundant responsibilities which I have characterized as a very slippery slope. Better stated, it is a false equivalency. I make that characterization since I believe it was the essence of the fatal mistake at TMI. There, the high pressure coolant injection system

(HPCI) did its job of initiation of HPCI with fully automatic and passive self-control, i.e., Rev. 3, function (2), above. Instead, one sees a grave human factors error in which the operator substituted his judgment for the “brain of the plant,”i.e., Rev. 3, function (5), above. Significantly, in Rev. 3, its five functional allocations are in the disjunctive, “or.” By comparison, in Rev. 2, its three functional assignments are functions (1), (2) separately or combined with the conjunctive

“and” (3) combinations of the two.” Rev. 2's three functional assignments are vague and overbroad, i.e., overly and unintentionally permissive. The error was giving the operator a control panel with a keyed switch that reflected the HPCI system design as “Auto Initiate, Key Override Off,” i.e., “go get the key.” Significantly, Rev. 3's disjunctive taxonomy disjoins function (5) operation by exception from Rev. 3's functions (1)-(4), especially (2) fully automatic and passive self-control, above. Thus, in a Rev. 3 analysis, that switch logically should not have been there in the first place. Its presence was an open, vague, and overbroad invitation to an ex-Navy operator to “do something” which nuclear submarine operational culture understandably creates. Instead, Rev. 3 gives you the option of (2) fully automatic control and passive self-control or option (5) operation by exception – not both. The switch itself is an oxymoron – or, to quote again Duke Power Chair Bill Lee, “If the operator(s) at Three Mile Island had fainted, we would have had a better outcome.”

It is facially evident that NUREG-0711 Rev. 3 is a significant and corrective revision of Rev. 2. In federal regulatory practice and procedural law, a revision displaces and supersedes its predecessor. If Rev. 2 had been republished as Rev. 2, Supplement 1, then Rev. 2 would remain in place and only be modified to the extent called for by the Supplement. Further, Rev. 3 is “state-of- the-art” with respect to its displaced predecessor, Rev. 2 – or at least should be so treated if 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(iii) is to be believed. Finally, and more serious, is the fact that § 50.34(f)(2)(iii) reflects the era of large control room panels installed in expansive layouts. If memory serves, the AP-1000 is designed with distributed control and computer screens. In this new era, control room panels and layouts can be accomplished with a computer software upgrade. The Boeing 737 MAX and the three Oconee Unit’s I&C modification to distributed controls by EDF/Areva should be consulted. Therefore, I respectfully disagree with the staff which “. . . does not have reason to question its earlier conclusions that the human factors engineering design for Vogtle Units 3 and 4 complies with this regulation [10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(iii)] and will maintain public health and safety.” To restate what I mention above, § 50.34(f)(2)(iii) makes no mention of NUREG-0711, Rev. 2 or Rev 3 for that matter. It merely mentions “state-of-the-art human factors principles . . .” that the applicant must provide to the Commission for review. 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(iii) is merely a reporting requirement that says nothing about the substance of the human factors engineering design.

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At this juncture, I respectfully request a copy of the 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(iii) HFE Report that I would like to study in detail for its compliance with the letter and spirit of the entirety of 10 CFR 50.34 and report what I may find back to you. Preliminarily, § 50.34(a)(1)(i) directs a requirement to report under § (a)(2) which requires “[a] summary description and discussion of the facility, with special attention to design and operating characteristics, unusual or novel design features, and principal safety considerations.” AP1000's “control room” that apparently consists of interactive computer screens is surely a novel design feature. A further example is found at § (a)(3)(ii) which requires information on “[t]he design bases and the relation of the design bases to the principal design criteria.” I am of the opinion that any (HFE) program should be traceable with part number specificity that relates back to § (a)(3)(ii) design bases and thus, that any training program must be grounded and revised on that “information.” It can also provide a hierarchical focus to any training program and procedure development that are part of an ongoing HFE program. To reiterate my previous letter, I trust you share my concerns and that appropriate action will be taken to bring the COL applicant of Vogtle Units 3 and 4 into compliance with NUREG-0711, Revision 3, vintage 2012 as well as the entirety of 10 CFR 50.54. And by “applicant,” I refer to Southern Nuclear, not INPO or its accrediting agency operating within the Department of Energy. Adding to that, INPO, as you know, is an industry-funded group interested in nuclear power operations which I believe is the reason that INPO’s Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) holds: The traditional JTA method can be used for any job at a plant. This method of JTA is best used for operating, maintenance, and technician jobs. In general, this method results in a good identification of necessary job skills, lower level cognitive knowledge objectives, and a very good linkage to performance-based training objectives. The JTA and JCA traditional methods described above can be very resource intensive. In response to this concern, “table-top” methods have been developed. Table-top analysis is a process, the success of which depends upon a small team of SMEs [Subject Matter Experts] and a facilitator to reach consensus on job needs. Table-top methods can be very effective in quickly determining, at reasonable costs, the tasks or activities that must be performed by persons employed in a particular job. Table-top analysis methods operate on the following three premises:

o expert workers are better able to describe and define their job than anyone else. o Any job can be effectively described in terms of the tasks or activities that successful personnel perform in that job.

o All tasks or activities have direct implications for the knowledge, skills and attitudes that personnel must have in order to perform thetasks safely and correctly.

To restate what I stated in the Southern Nuclear letter, “SAT [Systematic Approach to Training] contends it can be used for ‘any job’ whether operating, maintenance or technician. This flies in the face of the real-time demands of nuclear plant operators in emergencies that are not faced by maintenance or technical personnel.” Likewise, airline pilots are different animals from maintenance and technical personnel. Real-time demands and task overload are things we can learn from the aviation industry. That perhaps is the explanation for Brookhaven National Lab’s involvement with Westinghouse in plant design and why Brookhaven was the sole contributor to NUREG-0711, Revision 3.

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In any event, it remains for Westinghouse and Brookhaven to be the principal engineering and human factors expert sources for training and procedure design. Once that is fully accomplished, explicated, and used as the input for simulator algorithms, operator real-time feedback into the process is warranted. I would project that would be an ongoing iterative process over the life of the plant.

Your continued attention to these matters is highly appreciated. Very truly yours,

/s/ Daniel J. Shea

DANIEL J. SHEA

Attch:: DS Ltr. to SN, 10/30/2017

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