Attorney
Resume:
ELLEN RADIN, ESQ.
SCOTCH PLAINS, NJ 07076
adc5gl@r.postjobfree.com
Dear Counsel:
I am very interested in the job opening that you posted. Please allow me to tell you a little bit about myself. I have thirteen years experience at the law firm of Ginarte Gallardo Gonzalez & Winograd, LLP, a leading workers compensation and personal injury firm. I handled workers compensation cases there for several years, appearing in court virtually every day. I met with clients, appeared at pre-trials and motions, negotiated settlements and put them through. I drafted Certification and briefs. I tried a case as to whether petitioner was an employee or independent contractor; the case settled after the judge determined that petitioner was an employee. I took testimony and defeated a motion to dismiss alleging that the accident had never occurred. That case is still pending. I was a member of the Inns of Court for several years, and attended Bench Bar and other continuing legal education courses.
I also handled Social Security cases at Ginarte, supervising one other attorney and a support staff. We then had over 800 cases. We accepted cases at any point through the initial application through the Federal District Court levels. I negotiated several Federal court remands by consent of the US attorney. We also won several remands by the judge after briefing, with or without oral argument . I belonged to and attended conferences of the National Organization of Social Security Claimants Representatives.
My family law work at Ginarte including a trial in which the judge awarded my client, a man, half of all assets accumulated by unmarried co-habitants. Assets included the settlements of a personal injury lawsuit, real estate, bank accounts, and cattle held in Brazil. I served on the Matrimonial Early Settlement Panel and the Family Law Committee in Union County. I attended Family Law programs presented by the Union County Bar Association.
Please also review my resume for my experience prior to joining the Ginarte firm. I would very much like to meet with you.
Thank you for your attention to this matter
Very truly yours,
Ellen Radin, Esq.
ELLEN RADIN, ESQ.
2358 Carol Place
Scotch Plains, NJ 07076
adc5gl@r.postjobfree.com
Page 1 of 2
Legal Experience
Attorney / Ginarte Gallardo Gonzalez & Winograd, LLP, Newark NJ DEC 2006 – JAN 2020
Workers compensation practice from initial interview with petitioner through settlement of case. Motion practice including drafting of certifications, briefs and hearings. Social Security Disability practice from initial application through approval of claim, including practice in Federal District Court. Family law practice including matrimonial and non-dissolution matters.. Solo Practitioner / Scotch Plains NJ
OCT 1993 – DEC 2006
Family law practice, including matrimonial, non-dissolution, and domestic violence. Representation of parents accused of neglect or abuse by Division of Youth & Family Services. Residential real estate practice.
Law Editor / New Jersey Law Journal, Newark NJ
JAN 1993 – AUG 1993
Researched motion and pretrial practice for New Jersey Superior Court Bench Book. Edited directories, managed manuscript of New Jersey Insurance Law. Researched ADR programs for New Jersey Dispute Resolution.
Associate Attorney / Bette R. Grayson, Esq., Springfield NJ JUL 1986 – SEP 1990
Motion and pretrial practice in matrimonial, contract, real estate, landlord/tenant and municipal law. Associate Attorney / Alberto Ulloa, Esq., Elizabeth NJ MAY 1985 – JUL 1986
Motion and pretrial practice in matrimonial, contract, real property, and personal injury law. Law Editor / Commerce Clearing House, Clark NJ
NOV 1983 – MAY 1985
Annotated Court and agency decision in securities, commodities, bankruptcy and banking law. Page 2 of 2
Education
J.D. / Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, New York NY 1982.
B.A., English / Barnard College, Columbia University, New York NY 1978. Concentration in writing.
Memberships
Union County Bar Association, including several years on Family Law Committee. National Organization of Social Security Claims Representative 2002 - 2018
Panelist in Union County Matrimonial Early Settlement Panel 2000 - 2017
District XII Fee Arbitration Committee
2012 - 2014
Women lawyers in Union County
member for many years and a term ad co-president
Awards
Equal Justice Medal from Legal Services of New Jersey Sep 2005, for providing free legal services to their clients Certificate of Appreciation from Women Aware, Inc. in New Brunswick Mar 2003, for providing free legal services to their clients Certificates from the National Council of Jewish Women, Essex County Section Aug 2004, Jun 2002, Dec 2000 and May 1999, for providing free legal consultations to their clients. Bar Admissions
New Jersey
Supreme Court of the United States
1
GINARTE O’DWYER GONZALEZ & WINOGRAD LLP
400 Market Street
Newark, NJ 07105
Attorney for Defendant
Our file NO
) SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
E.D.S. ) CHANCERY DIVISION
Plaintiff )
) MIDDLESEX COUNTY
vs. ) CIVIL ACTION
)
J.R., et al. ) DOCKET NO.: FM-xx
)
Defendants )
)
)
_
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION
2
_
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 3
TABLE OF CASES 4
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 13
POINT I 14
Defendant should be Granted
Pendente Lite or Injunctive Relief
Granting Him Possession of the Residence.
POINT II 22
DEFENDANT SHOULD BE PERMITTED
TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
CONCLUSION 25
3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Rule 4:9-1 24
4
TABLE OF CASES
Page
B & S Ltd. v. Elephant & Castle,
388 N.J.Super. 160, 167-168 (Ch. Div. 2006). 16
Carney v. Hansell 24
363 N.J.Super. 111 (Ch. Civ. 2003)
Connell v. Diehl, 20
397 N.J.Super. 477 (App. Div. 2008)
Crowe v. De Gioia, 15-18;
22
90 N.J. 126 (App. Div. 1982)
Deganaars v. Degenaars, 17
186 N.J.Super. 233 (Ch. Div. 1982
Devaney v. L’Esperance, 21
391 N.J.Super. 448 (App. Div. 2007)
Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 18-
19;24
80 N.J. 378, (1979).
Matter of the Estate of Robert P. Quarg, 20
397 N.J.Super. 559 (App. Div. 2008),
Mitchell v. Oksienik,
380 N.J. Super. 119 (App. Div. 2005) 19-20
Olsen v. Stevens, 322 N.J. Super. 119 (App. Div. 1999) 18 5
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts in this matter are more fully set forth in the Certification of J.R. Attention is respectfully directed to that Certification and the exhibits thereto.
Plaintiff and Defendant met in 1994. Each is an immigrant to this country, plaintiff from Brazil, defendant from Portugal. Each speaks Portuguese and very minimal English. When they met, each party was around age 40 and not married. Each had been married before and had adult children from other relationships. Plaintiff’s adult children were in Brazil; defendant’s were in New Jersey. The parties began living together in an apartment in Perth Amboy on March 1, 1995.
Plaintiff did not work outside the home. Defendant worked in construction and was the breadwinner. Defendant paid virtually all of the couple’s living expenses. In August 1995 they moved to another apartment in Perth Amboy.
The parties wished to marry but plaintiff said they could not because of problems with birth certificates and other documents. The parties nevertheless held themselves out as married and considered themselves married. They behaved as any 6
couple in a traditional marriage. Plaintiff used defendant’s last name. The parties co-mingled their finances, having many different joint accounts.
On November 15, 1995 the parties were in an automobile accident. Defendant had relatively minor injuries and his personal injury lawsuit was later settled for $35,000. Plaintiff had severe injuries and was taken to the hospital. There, she signed herself in as E.R., using defendant’s last name. Plaintiff had a fractured spine and required back surgery. She was hospitalized for weeks or months. Defendant visited her often in the hospital and brought her food he had cooked himself at their home.
The plaintiff was in a wheelchair for three months after being released from the hospital She required months of therapy after that. Defendant cared for her as much as any loving husband. Defendant fed and bathed plaintiff as if she were a baby. He comber her hair and cut her nail. He changed her diapers. Defendant made sure plaintiff took her medicines. He drove her to doctors and therapists. He helped her learn to walk again.
Plaintiff’s personal injury lawsuit was settled for $2 million gross, with plaintiff receiving $1,300,000 after paying the lawyer and hospital. Plaintiff received a lump sum of 7
$250,000, and then installments from an annuity. The annuity pays her $2,000 per month, at 3% compounded annually; $50,000 on October 10, 2002; $50,000 on October 10, 2007, $75,000 on October 12, 2012 and $100,000 on October 10, 2017. The parties looked for a home to buy. Defendant first saw the house at and told plaintiff about it. They later spoke to the homeowner. Defendant negotiated the price. The parties went to the closing together on December 17, 1997. The purchase price of $138,000 came out of plaintiff’s first installment of
$250,000. There was no mortgage on the home.
Title was into the plaintiff’s name alone. The parties had been told by people in the Brazilian and Portuguese communities that if defendant’s name were on the deed, and defendant died, defendant’s grown son could take the house away from plaintiff and she would be out on the street. The defendant believed this and never consulted an attorney. The parties were not worried about the reverse situation i.e. plaintiff’s grown children coming to take the house away from defendant, because plaintiff’s children were back in Brazil.
Plaintiff told defendant that the house was his, because he had done so much for her and taken such good care of her after the car accident. Defendant fully believed that the house was his.
8
On the same day as the closing on the house, the parties put $93,953.16 into a CD at First Savings Bank in joint names. They renewed that CD for several years. One day defendant saw a notice from the bank stating that the account was closed. Plaintiff told defendant she had moved the account to a joint account at Banco Popular with a higher interest rate. It is not clear at this point in the litigation as to what exactly did happen to the First Savings Bank CD.
The parties resided together at the Dunbar Avenue house for an additional ten years. The defendant continued to work in construction and to pay the majority of the parties’ living expenses. Defendant paid most of the real estate taxes and utilities on the house. Plaintiff was the homemaker. In the belief that the house was his, and that the parties were in effect married, defendant also made significant improvements to the home. Defendant finished the basement and installed an entrance from outside to the basement. Defendant installed two new bathrooms and renovated the existing bathroom. Defendant bought and installed a new gas stove in the kitchen. Defendant cemented the yard and put up a fence. Defendant painted the entire house, inside and out. He did all of the landscaping and gardening. Defendant made for all supplies and did most of the physical work himself.
9
In March of 1999 the parties bought another house as in investment. They continued to reside at the Dunbar Avenue house. Each party contributed to the purchase price of the second house. This house was placed into both names. Because the parties did not reside in that house, they were not as fearful of plaintiff being forced out should defendant predecease her. Nevertheless, they had some fears and sold the house only two years later for $110,000. The closing was on March `16, 2001 The proceeds of the sale, roughly $97,000, were put into two CDs and Banco Popular. The CDs were in joint names and renewed on every March 16 for a few years.
On March 2, 2002 plaintiff bought a wedding ring.
Although the parties each had separate accounts, the majority of their funds were in joint accounts. There was a joint stock and brokerage account at MFS Investment Management. This was moved to an account at Banco Popular in 2001. The parties feared that stock prices would fall after the attach on the World Trade Center.
In 2002, plaintiff began to deplete the joint accounts and put all funds into other accounts in her sole name. Defendant did not know this at the time.
By May of 2003 the CDs from the sale of the second house were worth over $104,000. Those funds were place into a pre- 10
existing account in the name of defendant, payable on death to the plaintiff. After the deposit of the CD funds, the total value of the account was $112,118.65. Defendant had given plaintiff a Power of Attorney for that account because a bank employee told the parties that plaintiff would have trouble accessing the account if defendant died because plaintiff did not have a Social Security number.
On May 20, 2003, plaintiff, using the Power of Attorney from defendant, had all of the funds wired out of defendant’s account and put into an account at BCP Bank in plaintiff’s sole name. Thus, the jointly held funds from the sale of the jointly held Amboy Avenue house went into plaintiff’s sole name. The parties had three joint CD’s at BPA Bank. Plaintiff closed them all and withdrew the balances of $71,435.09;
$50,495.47 and $79,833.15.
The parties had a joint CD at Provident Bank. Plaintiff withdrew the $70,725.70 from that account on November 16, 2002. The parties also had a joint savings account at Provident Bank. Plaintiff made four withdrawals of $25,000, $4,000, $2,000 and
$16,8660.94 between 2001 and 2003. She left nothing in the account.
In May 2003 plaintiff also opened an account in her sole name at Millennium BCP. She placed $162,614.13 into that 11
account. (The opening of this account does not coincide with the receipt of any funds from the personal injury settlement.) On May 24, 2005 plaintiff withdrew $69,032.16 from that account. On April 20,2007 she withdrew $8,500. There was $84,650.82 remaining as of October 23, 2007. Defendant does not know the current balance.
In 2004 the parties were still living together. Defendant still loved and trusted plaintiff. They began plans to retire to Brazil and make joint investments in that country. They began purchasing a property in a very upscale area of Bahia, Brazil. The property was named P--- T It is a motel with sixteen apartments plus a luxury four-bedroom residence. Plaintiff told defendant the property was being purchased in both names.
The parties also purchased another property. Again, plaintiff told defendant that the investment was in both names. In May 2004 plaintiff began wiring funds to Brazil to pay for P—- T--- and the cattle. There is a limit as to how much may be wired in one day. Plaintiff therefore went to the bank every couple of days to wire funds. Funds that had been in joint accounts, or in defendant’s name, were used for this purposed. In late 2005 or early 2006 the parties decided to go to Brazil. Plaintiff bought only a one-way ticket. She was afraid 12
that she could not re-enter the United States because she did not have proper documents. Since she did not intend to return, plaintiff removed all of her jewelry from her safe deposit box at the bank and took the jewelry with her.
Defendant bought a two-way ticket. It was the parties’ intention that defendant would return to wind up the parties business affairs in this country before joining plaintiff in Brazil.
Plaintiff gave defendant a Power of Attorney. It was plaintiff’s idea to do this. The document was prepared for her by an attorney. Defendant did not prepare the document. In Brazil, defendant purchased items for the hotel. Shortly after arriving in Brazil, the defendant discovered that his name was not on the deed to the real estate or the documents regarding the cattle. When questioned, plaintiff promised to put his name on those assets.
Defendant was approached by a friend of plaintiff. He wanted to be a partner in the motel business. Defendant did not want to do this. The friend started to come to the motel drunk, waving a gun around, talking nonsense. Plaintiff seemed to be in agreement with the friend.
It was decided that defendant would return to the United States but not come back to Brazil. Plaintiff again, even at 13
the moment of the parties’ breakup, believed that the house was his and he could do anything he wanted with it because he already had the Power of Attorney.
Defendant did return to the house. He lived there for an entire year, paying all of the expenses himself. Plaintiff never challenged his residing there, never said she wanted to come back, never denied that the house was defendant’s. Knowing that the relationship was over, defendant in 2007 decided to sell the house, buy something smaller, and invest the remaining proceeds.
On April 17, 2007 defendant was out during the day. When he came home, he found the plaintiff and another person changing the locks to the house, in order to lock out defendant. Defendant telephoned a friend who speaks a little English, the friend called the police. Plaintiff through her companion told the police officer that plaintiff’s name was on the Deed, not defendant’s, that plaintiff lived in the house, that defendant was a trouble maker and so on. The police officer did not ask for any proof that plaintiff did reside in the house. Defendant showed the officer copies of his driver’s license, registration and car insurance to prove that he resided at the house. The officer nevertheless told defendant that he would have to leave since his name was not on the deed. The officer permitted 14
defendant to take a small safety box with him, after first demonstrating that none of plaintiff’s belongings were in the box.
In obedience to the officer, defendant left the premises. Since that day, defendant has been residing in another residence and paying rent there. Plaintiff returned to Brazil shortly after the incident and does not reside in the home either.
There has never been any court order removing defendant from the home or determining which of the parties is entitled to possession pending trial.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Verified Complaint and application for an Order to Show Cause were filed by plaintiff’s attorney Arlindo Araujo, Esq. on April 25, 2007. On May 1, 2007 Judge Chambers issued an Order to Show Cause. On July 2, 2007 Judge Chambers issued an Order entering various restraints, providing for discovery, etc.. On July 9, 2007 defendant’s former attorney Emery Z. Toth, Esq. filed a Certification opposing the Order to Show Cause, and an Amended Answer and Counterclaim. He also filed a Notice 15
of Lis Pendens on the house. Mr. Toth represented co-defendant Maria (Last Name Unknown) later identified as Maria Santos. Depositions were held in the summer of 2007.
Judge Ciuffani issued a Case Management Order on September 7, 2007.
Plaintiff filed an Answer to the Counterclaim.
On February 2008 Judge Ciufanni issued an order Extending Discovery until June 15, 2008.
Ellen Radin, Esq., of the firm of Ginarte, O’Dwyer, Gonzalez & Winograd, LLP. substituted in for defendant Jose Rodrigues in April 2008.
16
POINT ONE
Defendant Should be Granted Pendente Lite
or Preliminary Injunctive Relief
Granting Him Possession of the Home
The Court has the authority to grant defendant the right to reside in the home pending trial in this matter. Equity demands that defendant permitted to return to the home he was forced to vacate without any notice, without any right to be heard and without any court order.
A. Standards for Pendente Lite Possession or Injunctive Relief The standards for preliminary relief and possession of real estate in cases of unmarried, cohabitating partners are set forth in Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982). There, plaintiff claimed that defendant had promised to “take care of her and support her for the rest of her life, and that he would share with her his various assets.” In return, she “acted like his wife, cooking, cleaning, caring for him when he was ill, helping in his various business ventures.” The parties lived together for thirteen years in defendant’s house. When the parties separated, he promised to give her a good financial 17
settlement. When he did not, she filed suit.
Defendant denied these allegations and claimed the parties had not lived together and that he had not promised to support her for the rest of his life or share his assets with her. At the trial level, plaintiff sought interim relief including, inter alia, the right to remain in the house owned by the defendant. The trial court granted that relief and defendant appealed. The Appellate Division concluded that preliminary relief was unavailable.
The Supreme Court held that preliminary relief was available and was appropriate. The Supreme Court examined four factors: 1) the existence of irreparable harm if preliminary relief were denied; 2) the enforceability of the underlying agreement, 3) whether material facts were in dispute and the need to maintain the status quo, and 4) the relative hardship to each party of granting or denying preliminary relief. Ultimately, the Supreme Court permitted Crowe to reside in the house owned by defendant pending trial.
These four factors are virtually identical to the standards for grant of a preliminary injunction in non-family cases. See e.g. B & S Ltd. v. Elephant & Castle, 388 N.J.Super. 160, 167- 168 (Ch. Div. 2006).
In the instant case, defendant meets all four factors. 18
1. Irreparable harm
Defendant will continue to suffer further irreparable harm if he is not granted possession of the house.
The Supreme Court in Crowe found that a preliminary injunction was needed to prevent irreparable harm. The court held that:
Crowe was threatened with the loss of her home of
14 years and her only means of support. The
interest of an unmarried cohabitant in
enforcement of a support agreement and the trauma
of eviction from one’s home may well justify the
intervention of equity. Neither an unwarranted
eviction nor reduction to poverty can be
compensated adequately by monetary damages
awarded after a distant plenary hearing. Crowe,
p. 133-134.
Similarly, the courts have awarded pendente lite possession of a marital home to one spouse after the other’s voluntary long term absence, even in the absence of actual physical or emotional injury. Deganaars v. Degenaars, 186 N.J.Super.233 (Ch. Div. 1982). The Degenaars court found that:
it would be inimical to the best interests of and
welfare of plaintiff and the children to permit their lives, both emotionally and physically, to be traumatically invaded by defendant’s unilateral decision to resume residency in the marital home. The interest and welfare of plaintiff and the children will best be served by maintaining the status quo ante as initiated by defendant himself.
Degenaars, p. 235
19
In the instant case, defendant is more than threatened with the loss of a long time home, the loss has actually occurred due to the “self-help” of the plaintiff and defendant’s very understandable obedience to police instructions. He suffered a
“trauma of eviction” greater than that which threatened Crowe; she at least was served with papers and had an opportunity to be heard in court. Defendant here came home one day to find plaintiff and a friend of hers changing the locks. After calling for police assistance, he was told to leave. Each month that he continues to be of his home causes him to pay additional rent to reside elsewhere and to suffer further emotionally. Defendant will continue to suffer further irreparable harm if he is not granted possession of the house.
ii Enforceability
The agreements between plaintiff and defendant are enforceable.
The Supreme Court in Crowe found that temporary relief was appropriate since “It has long been recognized that an agreement between unmarried cohabitants is enforceable”. The court relied on Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, (1979). There, plaintiff was an immigrant woman with little knowledge of the English language. The parties lived together for fifteen years, 20
without being married. Plaintiff provided services such as housekeeping, shopping, accompanying defendant as he desired, serving as hostess, and so on. Defendant was the breadwinner. After a brief separation defendant promised to take care of plaintiff for the rest of her life if only she would come back and resume their prior arrangement. Plaintiff did so. The parties were originally married to other people during the parties relationship. Plaintiff divorced her husband early in the relationship between the parties; defendant did not divorce his wife until the very end.
The Kozlowski court found plaintiff was not entitled to alimony or equitable distribution, those remedies being available only to a wife upon divorce. But, the Kozlowski court found, that “an agreement between adult parties living together is enforceable to the extent it is not based on a relationship proscribed by law, or on a promise to marry.” The court upheld the trial court determination that the defendant’s promise to support the plaintiff was enforceable.
In Olsen v. Stevens, 322 N.J. Super. 119 (App. Div. 1999) the court permitted defendant to remain in possession based on her allegation of a promise that she could do so until her daughter completed high school. There, the court reversed a summary judgment motion that had granted a partition sale and 21
remanded the matter.
As in the cases above, the parties in the instant case had a long-term cohabitation, defendant provided services to the plaintiff such as caring for her after the car accident and supporting her financially throughout the relationship, driving her wherever she needed to go (plaintiff does not drive), and so on as outlined in defendant’s Certification. The parties’ relationship was not proscribed by law, as neither was married to anyone else at the time they cohabited. The services performed by defendant were not based on a promise to marry; plaintiff had explicitly stated she could not marry due to lack of proper legal documents. Defendant’s services were based on plaintiff’s promise that the house was his, and that the parties considered themselves to be married.
The lack of defendant’s name on the Deed to 31 Dunbar Avenue is no impediment to defendant’s eventual success at trial. In Mitchell v. Oksienik, 380 N.J. Super. 119 (App. Div. 2005), the house purchased with joint funds in man’s name only. The court held:
There two people went forward as any married
couple goes forward...The decided to buy a
house together. They purchased a house
together, similar to married couples. Very
often because one of the people in a
marriage has credit problems...there are a
variety of reasons that one of the two will
not show up on mortgage documents There
22
are all sorts of things than can happen. In
this case there was a suggestion by somebody
that it might be better for the defendant to
be the one named on the documents and they
proceeded in that fashion... Mitchell, pp.
124-125.
The court awarded plaintiff an equal share of the value of the
house based on equitable principles:
Although distribution of individually owned
assets is improper under the rubric of
“equitable distribution” where unmarried
cohabitating parties are involved, such
persons who have engaged in a joint venture
to purchase property in which they reside,
are entitled to seek a partition...As joint
venturers the parties are entitled to seek a
partition of their property when their joint
enterprise comes to an end irrespective
of how title is formally held. Mitchell,
p.127.
The court emphasized that the parties’ agreement by be express or implied and that the court must look to reasonable expectation and assume that the parties intended to deal fairly with each other. The court concluded that “It is clear...that the purchase of property under one unmarried cohabitant’s name is essentially irrelevant to an equitable action.” P. 130. The court ultimately concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to support a claim that defendant had promised to give 23
plaintiff the particular property.
In Connell v. Diehl, 397 N.J.Super. 477 (App. Div.2008) the parties cohabitated and held themselves out as husband and wife. The man started investing in real estate. He deposited rental income into a joint checking account. He told the woman that the residential real estate investments were for their future retirement. The house was called “our home” but purchased in his name alone. The parties spend vacations together. Her $70,000 inheritance was placed into a joint account, then taken out and put into an account in his sole name. The court remanded for further factual findings on the partition isssue, holding that
“if the judge finds a joint venture existed, he must partition the home. If he concludes otherwise, a mere return of Connell’s investment is not equitable. The judge must determine the present value of $70,000 as though it had been invested in some reasonable manner, such as certificates of deposit. Alternatively, he may determine its present value based on the appreciation in the value of the family home since it was remodeled. Otherwise, Diehl will have enjoyed the use of
Connell’s money without recompenses. Connell, p. 501. In the Matter of the Estate of Robert P. Quarg, 397 N.J. Super. 559 (App. Div. 2008), the court found that implied contract could be even enforceable against the titled party’s estate.
This case is distinguishable from, e.g. Devaney v. 24
L’Esperance, 391 N.J.Super. 448 (App. Div. 2007) in that the parties here had a long-term
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