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ISSN 1935-0007

Cite as: 2012 (4) AELE Mo. L. J. 301

Jail & Prisoner Law Section – April 2012

Civil Liability for Wrongful Detention

of Detainees and Prisoners

Contents

Part 1 (This month)

Introduction

Mistaken identity

Miscalculation of sentence

Mistake of law

Personal involvement or knowledge

Qualified immunity

Part 2 (Next month)

Official policy or custom

Eleventh Amendment immunity

Damage calculations

Negligence

State law and federal claims

“Favorable termination” requirement of Heck v. Humphrey Resources and References

Introduction

The very essence of what jails and prisons do is keep detainees and prisoners in custody. Individuals are booked into such facilities on the basis of arrests, court orders, or judicial sentences. In some instances, however, detainees or prisoners claim that they are being held on the basis of mistaken identity, unlawfully beyond the term of their authorized sentence, past the date of a court ordered release, or on the basis of a miscalculation of the amount of time they have left to serve.

In such instances, they may bring lawsuits for money damages against agencies, officials or employees, under either federal or state law or both. This two-part article briefly examples some of the court decisions examining the circumstances in which such damages can be awarded and the defenses that may be asserted by various entities and individuals to such claims. It largely focuses on liability under federal civil rights law, 302

specifically 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, while acknowledging that many states do authorize state remedies, some of which may be statutory, for false imprisonment. Federal claims concerning pre-trial detainees are generally analyzed under the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures or the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Federals claims involving convicted prisoners arise out of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. This article does not address:

Lawsuits for false arrest or malicious prosecution, as its focus is on the liability of jails, prisons, and their officials and employees. Issues concerning the timeframe following an arrest within which those taken into custody must be brought before a court for a probable cause hearing. At the end of the article, there is a brief listing of relevant resources and references.

Mistaken identity

“You’ve got the wrong guy!” Many correctional employees have heard that from many prisoners. Sometimes, it turns out to be true. Must such claims be taken seriously and investigated? Sometimes they should be.

In Stalter v. State of Washington, #27118-4-II, 51 P.3d 837 (Wash. App. 2002), the court ruled that a county’s failure to promptly investigate detainees’ claims that they were not the persons sought by arrest warrants would violate a duty under Washington state law. Such violations, standing alone, were not a basis for federal civil rights claims, since a violation of state law is not necessarily a constitutional violation. When a systemic problem leads to misidentification, on the other hand, there may be a basis for federal civil rights liability. In Lee v. City of Los Angeles, #98-55807, 240 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 2001), a mentally disabled former prisoner and his mother stated a claim against city and county for failure to adequately train their employees in a case where improper identification of him as a fugitive sought in a warrant from another state allegedly led to his extradition and two-year imprisonment. See also Sanders v. N.Y. Dept. of Corrections, #97 Civ. 7112, U.S. Dist. Ct. (S.D.N.Y. April 12, 2001), reported in The New York Times, National Edition, p. A14 (April 13, 303

2001), in which New York officials reached a $3.25 million settlement in lawsuit over the mistaken two-year imprisonment of the same mentally ill homeless man extradited to the state after being misidentified as a fugitive drug dealer. State law may sometimes provide special defenses to claims based on such mistakes. In Perez-Torres v. State, #B179327, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 227 (Cal. App. 2nd Dist. 2005), California parole agents and other defendants were found immune from liability for a detainee’s incarceration in a county jail for 25 days based on mistaken identity under a state statute which provides immunity for both public agencies and employees for claims arising out of determinations as to whether to parole or release a prisoner.

Miscalculation of sentence

Sometimes, prisoners are kept confined beyond the authorized term of their sentence due to a miscalculation of their time served, of how much “good time” they should be credited with, or how various sentences run together. Courts are often unwilling to impose liability for simple mistakes in the absence of deliberate indifference. Illustrating this is Granberry v. Chairman of the Penn. Board of Probation and Parole,

#10-1514, 396 Fed. Appx. 877, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 20827 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.), in which a prisoner was serving a number of sentences, including one for parole violation, with some to be served consecutively. In reviewing his status prior to his scheduled re-parole release date, it was discovered that his maximum sentence had expired 31 days earlier. This was because one judge, in resentencing the prisoner, failed to specify that the new sentence was to run consecutively to other existing sentences. He was then released. He sued various officials, seeking damages for violation of his civil rights in keeping him confined past his sentence. Upholding summary judgment for the defendants, the appeals court ruled that their actions were a mistake, and, at most, negligence, and did not constitute deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s rights in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Similarly, in Montanez v. Thompson, #05-4430, 603 F.3d 243 (3rd Cir. 2010), a former Pennsylvania prisoner sued a records specialist with the state Department of Corrections, claiming that his alleged ineffectual action in resolving supposed errors in his sentencing calculation resulted in him being incarcerated beyond the maximum term of his imprisonment. Ruling that the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity, a federal 304

appeals court found that the defendant did not act with deliberate indifference towards any clearly established right that the plaintiff had. The records specialist responded quickly and communicated the issue to the appropriate parties for review. While the issue took some time to resolve, it was not a simple one, as his proper release date was “complicated by multiple convictions, parole, parole violation, ‘backtime,’ and vacated sentences.” There was no evidence that anything the records specialist did caused any delay in the prisoner’s release. Correctional officials can only make release decisions on the basis of the records that they have, and have no duty to conduct an extensive investigation for other information. In Alston v. Read, #10-15332, 663 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2011), a prisoner was held longer than he should have been, and argued that, had prison officials checked court records, they would have noticed that he was ordered to serve concurrent rather than consecutive sentences, and released him sooner. The defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, since there was no clearly established case law imposing a duty on them to review a prisoner’s original court records “beyond those in his institutional file.”

Mistake of law

Sometimes, a prisoner is kept in custody longer than he or she should have been due to a mistaken interpretation of law, or a complex legal issue that is not readily apparent. Illustrating this is Stein v. Ryan, #10-16527, 662 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2011), in which an Arizona man on lifetime probation since 1997 for attempted sexual contact with a minor violated his probation and was given a sentencing order in 2006 with a prison term of ten years. He remained incarcerated until 2009, even though the state supreme court ruled in 2008 that the maximum period of probation for his offense was five years, rather than probation for life. Therefore, when he violated probation in 2006, he had already been on probation longer than authorized by law for his offense. In his lawsuit against correctional officials, he claimed that his constitutional right not to remain incarcerated under a sentencing order subsequently held to be invalid was violated, and that the defendants were negligent under state law. The appeals court held that there was no duty, or authority, for correctional officials to review the legality of a prisoner’s sentencing order, so they could not be held liable for 305

failing to do so. Additionally, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the federal civil rights claim, as his continued incarceration had not violated any clearly established federal right.

Prison officials will ordinarily not be held liable for following what appears to be a facially valid court order even if it ultimately proves to be an order entered in error. In McKinney v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections, #09AP-960, 2010 Ohio 2323, 2010 Ohio App. Lexis 1908 (10th Dist.), an Ohio prisoner was placed on community control for a period of five years. The state moved to revoke that, and a court granted the motion.

A state appeals court held that the revocation was improper because it occurred after the five-year term had expired. He then sued the correctional department for false imprisonment. The state appeals court rejected the claim, since the judgment originally entered mandating his imprisonment was not void on its face, and its invalidity was only apparent after the appeals court decision ordering his release. Similarly, in Holmberg v. County of Albany, #90276, 738 N.Y.S.2d 701 (A.D. 2002), continued confinement of prisoner for a longer period of time than that stated in his sentence did not result in liability of county for false imprisonment and federal civil rights violation when the order specifying the date of the end of his work release program, violation of which resulted in his re-incarceration, was a “facially valid order” of a court with proper jurisdiction.

In order to be liable for violating a direct court order for a prisoner’s release or having an impact on their release date, a defendant must have knowledge of it. In Hess v. Dept. of Rehabilitation and Correction, #2004-09576, 2006 Ohio 7112, 2006 Ohio Misc. Lexis 194 (Ohio Ct. of Claims), an Ohio prisoner who was not released until five days after he was entitled to be free could not seek damages for false imprisonment from the state correctional agency when there was no proof that the Department had knowledge of a court order granting him additional credit for time previously served before he was released.

On the other hand, when a sentence or a portion of a sentencing order makes no sense, or is clearly erroneous, there may be no liability for disregarding it. In Whipple v. Department of Corrections, #3D03-2877, 892 So.2d 554 (Fla. App. 3d Dist. 2005), the court found that the Florida Department of Corrections did not falsely imprison an inmate 306

when it allegedly disregarded the language of a sentence imposed at trial providing that it was to be concurrent with a sentence imposed against him in an unrelated case. The Florida intermediate appeals court found that this language was a “nullity” because the sentence referred to arising out of the prior conviction had already been fully served, so that the Department was required, by a state statute, to run the new sentence consecutive to the sentence already served.

Clear disobedience of a known release order, on the other hand, is a relatively swift path to liability. In Slone v. Herman, #92-1459, 983 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1993), the court ruled that failure to release an inmate after a court order suspending his sentence became final deprived him of due process. Prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity in a suit seeking damages. Their reliance on the advice of counsel did not alter the result.

Personal involvement or knowledge

When a prisoner seeks to impose personal liability on a correctional employee or official for allegedly unlawfully prolonging his confinement, he must establish that the individual had some personal involvement in or at least knowledge of the facts creating the problem. In Feliciano-Hernandez v. Pereira-Castillo, #11–1052, 663 F.3d 527 (1st Cir. 2011), a prisoner was sentenced as a habitual offender on his conviction for lewd and indecent acts on the basis of a prior rape conviction. The sentence was for “perpetual imprisonment for treatment until his rehabilitation, to last a minimum of twelve years.” But he was not released until 27 years in custody, 15 years later than when he was eligible for release.

He claimed that prison officials were liable for keeping him in custody beyond his lawful term of imprisonment, and that he ceased needing additional therapy treatment long before he was released. The defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the prisoner failed to show that any of them individually were linked to specific acts that prevented him from being released earlier.

Similarly, in Rodriguez v. Broward Sheriff’s Office, #06-13171, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 9547 (Unpub. 11th Cir.), a Florida prisoner failed to present a valid federal civil rights claim for false imprisonment based on the fact that he was kept in custody for seven days longer than he should have, when he failed to show that either the sheriff’s office or a 307

defendant deputy had actual knowledge of documentation showing that he was entitled to release.

In Tindell v. Pennsylvania, #10-2319, 398 Fed. Appx. 696, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 22430

(Unpub. 3rd Cir.), a prisoner claimed that various correctional officials and a prosecutor conspired to charge him with assaulting another inmate and wrongfully used that charge to keep him incarcerated beyond the maximum term of his sentence. He sought damages for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution.

The prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity for his decision to prosecute the plaintiff. A number of other defendants could not be held liable, as the prisoner did not really show their personal involvement in his prosecution, but instead simply sought to impose liability based on their supervisory role in the correctional system. The prisoner’s demand for release had to be pursued in a habeas petition, and was relief not obtainable in a federal civil rights lawsuit.

In Shorts v. Bartholomew, #06-5877, 255 Fed. Appx. 46, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 24634

(Unpub. 6th Cir.), the court ruled that while an inmate was kept in the county jail over 200 days past his one-year sentence of incarceration (which was to be followed by several years of probation), there was no showing that the sheriff either directly imprisoned him beyond his sentence or was deliberately indifferent to the consequence of his inaction.

The chief jailer had contacted a state probation and parole officer to determine when the prisoner should be released on probation, but received no response. Claims against the sheriff in his individual capacity were, therefore, properly rejected, while further proceedings were ordered on official capacity claims.

Qualified immunity

A major defense that individual correctional employees or officials can raise to false imprisonment claims is qualified immunity, applicable when it cannot be shown that their actions violated clearly established law of which they should have known. In Porter v. Epps, #09-60324, 659 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2011), a Mississippi man convicted of breaking into a car received a five year sentence, with four years conditionally suspended, and the first year to be served in house arrest. After he was arrested again 308

during that first year on a misdemeanor charge, he was imprisoned for a total of fifteen months, until a state court held that the corrections department had not had the authority to reinstate the suspended four years of his sentence. He sued, claiming a violation of his constitutional rights.

The appeals court held that the prisoner’s detention for over 40 days in the absence of either a facially valid court order or warrant was a violation of his due process rights. The defendant Commissioner of the state Department of Corrections was entitled to qualified immunity from liability, however, since the department’s interpretation of the original sentencing order was objectively reasonable, even though a state court subsequently held that the interpretation was wrong. A $250,000 jury verdict, therefore, was overturned. Qualified immunity may be awarded because the employee acted on the information available to them at the time, even if it subsequently turned out not to be true. In Wilson v. Zellner, #5:99-cv-173, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (M.D. Fla. 2002), a correctional employee was entitled to qualified immunity for keeping prisoner in custody one day longer than he otherwise would have been released, based on a verbal representation that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest in another jurisdiction. The defense is unavailing when an individual is found to have violated clearly established law, on the other hand. See McGee v. Carrillo, #07-51363, 297 Fed. Appx. 319, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 21960 (Unpub. 5th Cir.), holding that a sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity on a prisoner’s claim that he was improperly kept in custody for almost a month after drug charges against him were dropped in another county. The sheriff failed to show that he had acted in good faith, based on the record. In Allen v. Guerrero, #03-1356, 688 N.W.2d 673 (Wis. App. 2004), the court held that it was clearly established law that deliberately holding a prisoner in custody beyond a statutorily prescribed mandatory release date violated the prisoner’s constitutional rights, so that Wisconsin Department of Corrections employees accused of keeping a prisoner incarcerated for 377 days beyond that date were not entitled to qualified immunity. 309

AELE Monthly Law Journal

Bernard J. Farber

Jail & Prisoner Law Editor

P.O. Box 75401

Chicago, IL 60675-5401 USA

E-mail: ac3d8e@r.postjobfree.com

Tel. 1-800-***-****

© 2012, by the AELE Law Enforcement Legal Center

Readers may download, store, print, copy or share this article, but it may not be republished for commercial purposes. Other web sites are welcome to link to this article.

The purpose of this publication is to provide short articles to acquaint the reader with selected case law on a topic. Articles are typically six to ten pages long. Because of the brevity, the discussion cannot cover every aspect of a subject. The law sometimes differs between federal circuits, between states, and sometimes between appellate districts in the same state. AELE Law Journal articles should not be considered as “legal advice.” Lawyers often disagree as to the meaning of a case or its application to a set of facts.

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