Training It
Resume:
United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES
TITLE:
THE MARINE CORPS MARTIAL ARTS PROGRAM:
SUSTAINING THE TRANSFORMATION
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES
AUTHOR:
RICHARD D. HALL
MAJOR USMC
AY 2001-02
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During times of peace, governments often reduce their warfighting focus, often leading to a less effective military.
Additionally, there are some who say America is becoming more desensitized to violence and more casualty averse. Together,
these conditions may cause the military to be less prepared to fight the next war. Consequently, it remains crucial for the Corps to
guard against external pressures that diminish combat preparedness. It must therefore continue to instill and maintain a warrior
ethos within every Marine. It is this ethos, developed during the transformation at recruit training and Officer Candidate School
that has defined what it means to be a Marine since 1775. The Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP) may well be the very
mechanism that helps sustain that vital ethos. It is the first close combat system that ties together the mental, character, and
physical disciplines into a program designed to effectively enhance a Marine s total capability. The program s synergy leads to
the creation of an ethical warrior who becomes more concerned for the team than himself, and one who not only understands but
also can apply the responsible use of force, a characteristic critical on todays and future battlefields.
14. SUBJECT TERMS (KEY WORDS ON WHICH TO PERFORM SEARCH) 15. NUMBER OF PAGES:
47
MARTIAL ARTS, CLOSE COMBAT, HAND-TO-HAND, MARINE CORPS
ETHOS, TRANSFORMATION 16. PRICE CODE:
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TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: The Marine Corps Martial Arts Program: Sustaining the
Transformation.
Author: Major Richard D. Hall, USMC
Thesis: Given the changing nature of society and its effect on America s
youth who make up the recruiting population, the Marine Corps Martial
Arts Program (MCMAP) may well be the mechanism that helps sustain that
vital Marine Corps ethos formed during transformation at recruit training
and Officer Candidate School.
Discussion: Historically, there has been a natural tendency for
governments to reduce their focus on warfighting issues during times of
peace which often leads to a less effective military. Additionally,
there are some who would say America is becoming more desensitized to
violence and more casualty averse. Together, these conditions may well
be the cause for the U.S. military to be less prepared to fight the next
war. Consequently, it remains crucial for the Corps to guard against
external pressures that might moderate or diminish combat preparedness.
It must therefore continue to instill and maintain a warrior ethos within
every Marine. It is this ethos, developed during the transformation at
recruit training and Officer Candidate School, or in the crucible of war,
that has defined what it means to be a Marine since 1775. The Marine
Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP) aids in sustaining that
transformation. It is the first close combat system that ties together
the mental, character, and physical disciplines into a program designed
to effectively enhance a Marine s total capability. The program s
synergy leads to the creation of an ethical warrior who becomes more
concerned for the team than himself, and one who not only understands but
also can apply the responsible use of force, a characteristic critical on
today s and future battlefields.
Conclusion and Recommendations: The Corps must maintain and never lose
its Marine Corps ethos or it will suffer a severe loss in warfighting
effectiveness. The Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP) is an
extremely valuable program in helping sustain the warrior transformation
and maintain that vital edge.
Amongst the key recommendations to ensure the program remains
viable in the future are the following: formally establish tie-ins as a
replacement for troop information requirements, institutionalize the
MCMAP as a formal part of the Marine Corps Physical Fitness Program, and
initiate a comprehensive educational effort to better familiarize
commanders about the MCMAP.
Table of Contents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT iv
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS v
PREFACE vi
PROLOGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
HISTORY OF MARINE CORPS TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Historical Trend 6
Changes and Influence ... 6
Evolution of Recruit Training . . . . . . . . . . 9
The Warrior Ethos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Post Entry-Level Training . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Training Philosophy & Methodology . . . . . . . . 20
DEVELOPMENT OF MARTIAL ARTS IN THE MARINE CORPS ... 24
Martial Philosophy 24
Evolution of Unarmed Combat . . . . . . . . . . . 26
CURRENT PROGRAM 34
Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
What Every Marine Expects and
Our Country Requires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
THE FUTURE PROGRAM 43
CONCLUSION 44
RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Acknowledgments
There are several people that I must thank for their
help during this project:
Mr. Peter Lubiowski, my former Tae Kwon Do instructor, for
his intensity and incredible talents, and for keeping the
martial arts fires burning.
LtGen George Ron Christmas, USMC (Retired) for his sage
wisdom and guidance. His influence largely framed the
direction of my paper.
LtCol George Bristol, USMC and MGySgt Cardo Urso, USMC for
working hard on creating and developing the new Marine Corps
Martial Arts Program, and for having a zealous approach in
training Marines.
SgtMaj Brian Pensak, USMC for his motivation, support, and
assistance in developing the MCMAP, and for being a great
role model.
My wife Amy, for taking care of our eight children while I
worked on this project.
iv
Illustrations
Figure 1. RECRUIT TRAINING CURRICULUM 1939 2000 ... 14
v
PREFACE
Throughout my life I have always been involved in one
way or another with martial arts, mostly Tae Kwon Do. After
joining my first unit as a Second Lieutenant, I was made the
Unarmed Combat Instructor for the company. Later, as a
Captain, I attended the Linear Integrated Neural-Override
Engagement or LINE Instructor Course shortly after its
inception. As the Commanding Officer for Combat Instructor
Company at The Basic School, I required all of my Marines to
go through the fairly new Close Combat Instructor Course. It
was during these training packages that I began to notice a
significant and visible change in the Marines who
participated and graduated from them. They began to act more
mature, were more highly motivated, became more active in
company events, and definitely wanted more training.
During this era General James L. Jones, our current
Commandant, began an initiative to formally establish a
Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP). He envisioned a
natural extension to our warrior ethos, a program that would
continue in the tradition of Every Marine a Rifleman.
Continuing in a tradition of 226 years which saw the Corps
become the finest fighting force the world has ever known,
this was to be a program that would enhance each individual s
vi
strengths in order to promote unit capabilities.
While serving at The Basic School, Marines under my
command were in the right place at the right time to be
called upon to receive the new MCMAP training and become some
of the first Martial Arts Instructor Trainers (MAITs). In
that capacity, I never heard them say that they had heard
anyone, who was familiar with the program, think it was not
an outstanding and worthwhile endeavor.
After reviewing the Commandant s intent, I became
interested in the program s future possibilities. I also
began to wonder if this would become just another requirement
to an already full plate. The interesting twist to my
investigation of this topic occurred while interviewing
Lieutenant General George Christmas. He identified this new
program as a possible means to sustain the transformation
that affected each Marine and to maintain the warrior ethos
developed during recruit training. It has been this ethos
that ultimately sustains us in battle and has given rise to
the noble reputation that Marines have enjoyed throughout the
Corps history.
vii
My direction was now set on evaluating the historical
development of Marine Corps training and how it related to
creating and sustaining a warrior ethos. Also, given the
changes in contemporary society, was a new program necessary
to continue this process? The answer to this question is
addressed in this paper.
viii
The steadily improving standards of living
tend to increase the instinct of self-
preservation and to diminish the spirit of
self-sacrifice . . . the fast manner of
living at the present day tends to undermine
the nervous system, the fanaticism and
religious and national enthusiasm of a
bygone age is lacking, and finally the
physical powers of the human species are
also partly diminishing . . . we should
[therefore] send our soldiers into battle
with a reserve of moral courage great enough
to prevent the premature moral and mental
depreciation of the individual. 1
1
Michael Howard, Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive
in 1914, in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret (New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1986), 519.
PROLOGUE
THE MARINE CORPS MARTIAL ARTS PROGRAM:
SUSTAINING THE TRANSFORMATION
People sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough men
stand ready to do violence in the night on their behalf.2
George Orwell
Part of the American military tradition is that during times of
relative peace the nation, and likewise its military, tends to lose focus
on warfighting and marginalizes or even decreases its military readiness.
Although this trend in peace seems inevitable as policymakers balance
guns or butter, it is incumbent upon the military and its leadership to
avoid this tendency and remain resolute in its dogged preparation for war
in the unfortunate event of its occurrence in the unforeseen future.3 The
potential danger lies in America s increasing sole reliance upon
technology over basic combat-related skills as the primary means to win
our nations battles. However, as Charles Ardant du Picq wrote in Etudes
sur le combat published posthumously in 1903, Battles [are] won not by
weapons but by men, and nothing could be effectively planned in an army
without exact knowledge of this primary instrument, man, and his moral
condition at the vital moment of combat . 4 It seems therefore a critical
requirement for the armed forces to not only enhance technology and
2
George Orwell, n.d., URL:, accessed 3 March 2002.
3
Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense (New
York, NY: Free Press, 1994). In their book, the authors describe and
analyze the development of military policy, the characteristics and
behavior of the armed forces in execution of that policy, and the impact
of military policy on America's international relations and domestic
development. It also describes in detail the role of social, economic,
and political forces that shape military policy. For other discussions
concerning the role of society upon the military see Russell Weigley, The
American Way of War, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press,
1987).
4
Michael Howard, Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive
in 1914, in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret (New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1986), 515.
2
improve its capability to fight, but also to develop the man and improve
his ability and willingness to fight.
It was within this context that the Commandant of the Marine Corps,
General James L. Jones, authorized the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program
or MCMAP. His vision was to refine, or, if necessary, create a program
that was more than just hand-to-hand combat. It was to become a weapons-
based martial arts system that would also imbue a Marine with a proper
understanding of the responsible use of force while further sustaining
the warrior ethos developed during entry-level transformation.5 Given the
two most recent attempts6 to incorporate a close combat system into the
Corps, two questions arise, is this program really necessary? And, will
it truly be different by succeeding in becoming a mechanism that actually
ensures America s soldiers of the sea retain a combat focus and remain
steadfast to its warrior ethos?
Through many competing interests and outside pressures like
political restraints, budgetary limitations, parochial infighting, and
societal concerns, the Marine Corps may find itself at times lacking in
combat preparedness. Regardless of these circumstances there remains one
aspect of preparation that the Corps must never forget or ignore: it must
remain steadfast to its ethos and not allow its warrior spirit to ever
wane or become irrelevant. This means it must hold on to that intangible
combination of higher character, physical toughness, and mental
discipline. These are the attributes that have allowed Marines to acquit
themselves on the battlefield in such a manner as to become known for
5
Lieutenant Colonel George H. Bristol, USMC PAO Guidance, Marine
Corps Martial Arts Program Syllabus, 28 September 2000. Cited hereafter
as PAO Guidance.
6
See pages 26-34.
3
everything synonymous with the highest of military virtue, honor, and
distinction.
The Corps ethos must therefore remain unyielding and intact, for
from it comes that wellspring of determination, self-discipline, self-
confidence, and pride.7 It must be continuously developed, shaped, and
honed in order to become immediately viable and applicable across the
entire spectrum of violence. Every facet is essential. It is physical
toughness that gives one the endurance to go beyond what he/she believes
is possible. It is character imbued with honor, courage, and commitment
that becomes the measure of a man and his ability to act honorably and
make proper decisions despite opposition.8 Finally, it is the addition of
mental discipline, in the form of a warrior mindset, that creates the
final aspect of synergy that forges a man s martial spirit into a force
that carries him above the horrors of war and allows him to carry the day
when all the odds are stacked against him.
The Marine Corps Martial Arts Program tackles the challenge of
integrating the separate disciplines of mental, physical, and character
in such a manner so as to create a warrior being, one capable of
effectively operating in the complex environment of the 21st century. 9
The Corps has always enjoyed the reputation for innovative
experimentation and successful implementation. Now, after several
previous attempts at incorporating close combat into its training
7
Lieutenant General George Christmas, USMC (Ret.), interview by the
author, 6 December 2001.
8
As Theodore Roosevelt once said, "Character, in the long run, is
the decisive factor in the life of an individual and of nations alike
Resources-Quotes, n.d., URL:, accessed 3
March 2003.
9
Sergeant Major Brian K. Pensak, USMC, Structure and History of the
Marine Corps Martial Arts Program, Marine Corps Martial Arts Program
4
program, the Marine Corps new martial arts program has a further
distinctive approach. It finally generates significant value added by
not only providing martial arts training, but also sustaining and
maintaining that warrior transformation developed during initial training
and, until now, had a tendency to subsequently disappear.10
History of Marine Corps Training
The purpose of all Marine Corps training is the development
of skilled forces-in-readiness prepared at all times to carry
out any mission assigned.11
The Marine Corps began to critically review its training in the
1930 s, but it wasn t until the 1970 s, that training really received any
methodical or scholarly attention.12 While there is plenty of data
cataloging recruit training, there remains no single, comprehensive
document that tracks the evolution of all Marine Corps training programs
from 1946-1978.13 That is not to say corporate learning and development
had not occurred, as evidenced by the many training manuals and orders
published separately during that period. However, even as of today,
there still has not been an historical piece written that ties all the
programs together.14
Syllabus, 11 October 2000. Hereafter cited as Pensak, Structure &
History.
10
PAO Guidance.
11
Major Paul Van Riper, USMC, Major Michael Wydo, USMC, and Major
Donald Brown, USMC, An Analysis of Marine Corps Training (Rhode Island:
U.S. Naval War College, 1978), 10. (Quoted from the Marine Corps Manual,
Washington D.C., 1961, para 1-27). Cited hereafter as Van Riper.
12
Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper, USMC (Ret.), e-mail interview
by author, 13 January 2002.
13
Van Riper, xx.
14
The majority of references pertaining to the history of Marine
Corps training are from Major Paul Van Riper s work, An Analysis of
Marine Corps Training, cited above, as there is little else currently
published on that topic. In an e-mail from GM13 Danny J. Crawford, Head,
Historical Reference Branch, History & Museums Division, Washington Navy
Yard in response to an inquiry on this topic from Dr. Donald Bittner,
5
Historical Trend
Historically, combat preparedness and training have been directly
related to the relative value placed upon the military itself. If
citizens view themselves relatively secure, then the need for domestic
programs rise and military force buildup diminishes. If the nation
perceives itself threatened, then the focus shifts to military
preparation. An example of this occurred after World War I when
President Wilson made an appeal for a new international order, a world
based on principle and law, rather than power and self-interest. With
that in mind, he drew up his Fourteen Points, making general
disarmament one of those points. Also during that period, the U.S. was
in a state of isolationism, tending to focus priorities on its own
internal domestic issues because it felt unthreatened as an island
nation and because it had firm European allies. 15 The underlying notion
was, when times are good military priorities become subordinate to
domestic ones.
Changes and Influence
Although most people understand the necessity for having the armed
services, many disagree on what the standards for those who comprise them
are or how robust and well equipped that force should be.16 Society
itself changes over time and consequently so does its principles and
moral values. These changes have a significant impact upon the
Professor of History, Marine Corps Command & Staff College, on 26 March
2002, Mr. Crawford writes, I m not aware of anything our Division has
produced on the history of Marine Corps training.
15
Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley, Rise to Globalism (New
York: Penguin Putnam Inc., 1997), 3. The author cites several other
historical examples of military priorities becoming subordinated to
domestic ones during times of peace and elevated during times of trial.
16
Colonel Robert Debs Heinl Jr., USMC (Ret.), Soldiers of the Sea
(Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1962), 603.
6
constituency of the force, as well as how the force views itself and how
others view it.
An example would be society s view on aggression and violence. On
the one hand, in the civilian world, domestic and one-on-one aggression
is viewed as a bad thing since society perceives itself as more civilized
and sensitive. Conversely, it also seems that people are becoming more
desensitized to violence as the entertainment industry and news media
influence continues to inundate the population with multiple images of
carnage and disaster, where death and dying becomes more common either in
make-believe computer games, films, or in news reports.17 Ironically,
the effect of this perspective has been the public s desire to minimize
peacetime training, as it may affect their image or sanctuary, and in the
case of war, the desire has been for it to become more technological,
short, and with as few casualties as possible.18 The impact on training
will be for the armed force to balance realistic and effective training
with the need to avoid training injuries, especially deaths.
Another example is how morals and values have changed over time.
There have been many debates as to what is acceptable and what is
17
Violence in television, 26 July 2001, URL:,
accessed 2 April 2002. Senator Sam Brownback, R-Kan, stated at a summit
on entertainment violence on 26 Jul 2001, that four national health
associations definitively linked violence in television, music, video
games and movies to increased aggression in children. Its effects are
measurable and long-lasting, according to a joint statement by the
American Medical Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the
American Psychological Association and the American Academy of Child and
Adolescent Psychiatry. Moreover, prolonged viewing of media violence can
lead to emotional desensitization toward violence in real life.
18
Quality and Quantity, n.d., URL:, accessed 2 April
2002.
7
not.19 What is not up for debate is the fact that the services still have
to recruit personnel from whatever form or state of society that does
exist. Regardless of the changes over decades, the Marine Corps has
shown the ability to adapt its training to meet those conditions. As
Colonel Robert Wagner noted, over time, we [saw] a softer recruit show
up for recruit training . . . we just had to work harder to get them up
to the standards. 20 Thus, the pre-condition may change but the end
result remains steadfast: producing a basically trained Marine.
It has become a truism that a certain minimum amount of realistic
and effective training is absolutely essential in order to build and
maintain individual and unit proficiency.21 As previously mentioned, there
is a tendency to minimize the importance of military effectiveness during
peacetime. There is also the possibility for external influences to
affect the amount of support received by the military which directly
impacts subsequent training effectiveness and warfighting development.
An example might be U.S. foreign diplomacy resulting in the cancellation
of a training exercise or use of a training area, or budgetary
constraints resulting in the non-purchase of a needed capability.
These then are the conditions that set the tone for how the
military will train and to what standards one will train. The military
19
J. Budziszewski, Plunging into Ruin, 1999, URL:,
accessed 2 April 2002; Kenneth L. Conner, Morality and the Rule of Law,
March 1999, URL:,
accessed 2 April 2002. These two articles address the issue of morals &
ethics from two different perspectives. The first discusses the nature of
declining morals. The second discusses morality as it relates to the
law.
20
Colonel Robert P. Wagner, USMC, interview by the author, 4
January 2002.
21
Marine Corps Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting
(Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 1997),60; Capt Ted
McKeldin, USMCR, From The Horse s Mouth (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps
Association, 1999), 20.
8
must and will remain subservient to its civilian leadership who represent
their constituency, the American people.22 However, the armed services
owe it to the public to constantly sustain its efforts to be the most
effective and proficient force it can be. In order to balance these
requirements, it becomes essential to clearly understand the requisite
capabilities needed to meet the now and future threat, while also
receiving the continued support of the public.
The Evolution of Recruit Training
Training that provides improved individual and collective
proficiency and prepares Marine Corps units to successfully
execute their primary mission shall be assigned top
priority.23
Although Marines trained in places like Parris Island prior to the
U.S. involvement in World War I, it wasn t until 1939, that the Corps
began to take on a systematic view of how it conducted training.24 This
more formal process focused mainly on recruit training, then only eight
weeks in length.
He learned discipline, military courtesy, close
order drill, and interior guard. He was given
thorough physical conditioning to prepare him
for the rigors of combat. He became intimately
familiar with his rifle . . . And he received
22
An example of the military being subordinate to its political
masters was demonstrated clearly when President Truman relieved the
distinguished, popular, and all powerful General Douglas MacArthur with
these few words, I deeply regret that it becomes my duty as President
and Commander in Chief of the United States Military Forces to replace
you as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers; Commander in Chief, United
Nations Command; Commander in Chief, Far East; and Commanding General
United States Army, Far East. You will turn over your commands, effective
at once, to Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway. The Relief of
MacArthur, n.d., URL:,
accessed 26 March 2002.
23
Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: MCO 1553.3
Marine Corps Unit Training Management, 11 June 1991, 2. Cited hereafter
as MCO 1553.3.
24
Van Riper, 246-247. Recruit training prior to 1939 will not be
covered as there was no formalized, systematic approach to training
during those early years and is therefore not pertinent to this topic.
9
elementary instruction in infantry combat
subjects, including the digging of foxholes,
bayonet, grenades, chemical warfare, map reading
and basic squad combat principles.25
Just prior to World War II, recruit training changed from eight weeks to
four. Then it was reduced to three, and then finally back to four
weeks.26 These rapid changes reflected the close scrutiny of post-
training proficiency (or lack thereof) coupled with the immediate
implementation of lessons learned. It also accounted for the need to
ship out a larger number of personnel preparing to go to war.27 The
result of the shorter curriculum was a drastic decline in proficiency,
especially marksmanship, which dropped as much as 25%.28 Recognizing the
need to improve the standards and maximize the number of hours that were
actually applied to training, the schedule underwent several more
revisions in order to optimize time and effectiveness.29 During the
course of the next few years, several significant changes occurred.
Earlier training focused simply on Field Skills and Marksmanship, with
field training generally increasing and becoming more specialized with
each succeeding year. But as additional feedback was received from
commanders in the operating forces, more classes, like range instruction
and drill, were added to provide a better recruit upon graduation.30
25
Van Riper, 247.
26
Van Riper, 248-252. The curriculum was shortened in order to
accommodate a large influx of personnel that would fill combat units.
The reduction in training time resulted in a drastic decline in the
quality of the graduating recruit. The curriculum was subsequently
increased to four weeks as a compromise.
27
Van Riper, 248, 281-282.
28
Van Riper, 248.
29
Van Riper, 252-254.
30
Van Riper 248-252.
10
The value of physical training was first recognized during World
War I, and later given more emphasis.
By May 1943 the physical training program at
Parris Island included 30 minutes of accelerated calisthenics
and body contact exercises and 30
minutes of massed barehanded boxing daily. In
addition, there were 30 minute periods each week
devoted to hand-to-hand fighting and unarmed combat, and
daily half-hour periods of swimming instruction for recruits
who could not meet the minimum qualification.31
In 1940, President Roosevelt stopped voluntary enlistment and began
selective service resulting in a lowering of physical and mental
standards.32 These shortcomings were partially offset by increasing the
length of recruit training to 12 weeks in hopes of building up the
recruit s strength. The course was later reduced to eight in order to
meet the need for forces in the fleet. Then in 1944, the Drill
Instructor School was created in order to improve the quality of
instruction and training.33 Shortly after the war a study of recruit
training from 1939-1945 was made. It determined that eight weeks of
training was the minimum necessary without sacrificing quality.34 It also
indicated a need to increase the emphasis on weapons instruction,
31
Van Riper, 252.
32
Gertrude G. Johnson, Manpower Selection and the Preventative
Medicine Program, n.d., URL:, accessed 27 March 2002. After the United States entered the
war, the picture changed radically. A large Army was needed immediately.
About 3,800,000 men entered the Army during 1942, through inductions and
enlistments. Physical standards had to be lowered to get the number of
men needed, and limited service personnel were accepted at a fixed
percentage of the quota.
33
History of Drill Instructor School, n.d., URL:,
accessed 27 March 2002.
34
Van Riper, 253-254.
11
physical training, and other combat-related subjects.35
Following the infamous 1956 incident where SSgt McKeon marched his
recruits into Ribbon Creek resulting in six deaths, recruit training
underwent many significant changes. One of those alterations was the
formalization of physical training conducted by a certified instructor
and the implementation of Pugil Stick fighting.36 Additionally, after
Recruit Training, all recruits would receive combat training at Infantry
Training Regiments (ITR) in order, . . . to ensure that all Marines
possessed the individual combat skills necessary to survive on the
battlefield. 37
During the 1960 s and 70 s, Recruit Training added not only
garrison-type classes and swimming, but also grenade and booby-trap
classes based upon the Vietnam experience.38 In 1967, Marine Corps Order
1510.13, Male Recruit Training, was published. This formally
standardized recruit training, and in 1973, recruit training and
individual combat training were combined at the recruit depots.39
The result of these changes was the creation of a training
curriculum that recognized and retained all the lessons learned, such as
the minimum time required to train proficiency in marksmanship, while
still remaining within practical limits. This basic foundation for
training included instruction in: discipline, military bearing, esprit de
corps (warrior spirit), character development, individual general
military subjects, individual combat basic tasks, marksmanship, and
35
Van Riper, 254.
36
Heinl, 593-594; Van Riper, 257-259.
37
Van Riper, 283.
38
Van Riper, 268-270, 285.
39
Van Riper, 264.
12
physical fitness.40 These lessons, which emphasized combat training and
marksmanship, were crucial to the development of a warrior ethos and the
making of a Marine.
As Figure 1 indicates, recruit training generally increased in
length over time, as did combat related training.41 The curriculum also
solidified the number of hours allocated to the foundational subjects
mentioned above. While garrison-type training remained relatively the
same, and administrative and commander s time was reduced, combat-related
training increased 231%. Additionally, while physical conditioning,
together with close combat remained about the same, the emphasis on close
combat increased.42
Throughout these transitions, the bottom line of recruit training
had remained intact. To take civilians and transform them from
individuals into team players who are disciplined, obedient, and
basically trained Marines who can succeed on the battlefield, in
garrison, and in society.43
40
Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: MCO 1510.32C
Recruit Training, 5 October 1999, 1-2. Cited hereafter as MCO 1510.32C.
41
Van Riper, 254. [A] study group investigating Marine Corps
Ground Training in World War II made several conclusions about training .
. . during the period 1939-1945: (1) Eight weeks proved to be the minimum
length to which recruit training could be cut without sacrificing
quality. (2) There was an ever increasing emphasis on training in
weapons, physical conditioning, and other combat subjects and a
corresponding decrease in training in close order drill, military
courtesy, interior guard duty, parades and ceremonies, and similar
garrison type subjects.
42
Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: ALMAR 042/01
Establishment of the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP), 200905Z
SEP 01. It was during October 2000 that the Marine Corps Martial Arts
Program was introduced, requiring 27 hours of training.
43
MCO 1510.32C, 1-2.
13
RECRUIT TRAINING CURRICULUM 1939 - 200044
Figure 1:
(Earlier samples, 1939-1965, do not account for all hours or total field training )
SUBJECT 193*-****-**** 196*-****-****
(Number Training Wks) 4 7 12 8 11 12
Code of Conduct 2 2 2
Military Law 3 2 4 4
Leadership 5 2 3.5
Orientation 16 8 9.5 9.5
History & Customs 7 3 9 7 6.5 6.5
Mission & Org 1 1
Uniform & Equip 15 12 15 15
Interior Guard 6 11 5 4 8 8
Close Order Drill 31 44 72.5 53 45 54.5
Parades & Ceremonies 16 9 9 9
Total Garrison 44 58 136.5 102 102 113
Hygiene 4 4 3 ?
Field Living 1 1 4 ?
First Aid 3 3 4.5 ?
Observe & Report 2 ?
Ind. Movement, Day 3 ?
Camouflage & Cover 1 ?
Ind. Movement, Night 2 ?
Helo Ops 1 ?
Field Fortifications 1 ?
NBC Defense 4 ?
Offensive Combat 10 ?
Defensive Combat 15 ?
Grenades & Pyro 5 ?
Mines & Booby traps 4 ?
Field Training, Gen 34 72 ? ? - ?
Total Combat Trng 34 72 15? 7? 59.5 137.5
Rifle Mechanics 2 17 10 10 10
Rifle Marksmanship 70-70-124-**-**-**
Field Firing 8 7 7
Pistol Mech & Marksman 7 6 3 3
Swimming 10 8 16 16
Marches 16 4.5 13
Physical Conditioning ? 10.5 79 54 80 59
Bayonet 5 8 8
Close Combat 14 8 9 27
Total Marksmanship/PT 91 98.5 255.5 183 214 224
Sub-Total Training 169 228.5 407 292 375.5 474.5
Admin Time ? ? ? 41 1175.5 988
Mess & Police - - 46.5 - - -
Commander s Time ? ? 18.5 93 255 55.5
Performance Evals ? ? 27 17 42
Sub-Total Admin Time ? ? 92 151 1472.5 1043.5
GRAND TOTAL 169 228.5 499-***-**** 1518
44
Van Riper, 249-277; Recruit Training Schedule, 1 October 2000,
URL:, accessed 28 December
2001.
14
Throughout the Corps history, the importance of basic training
became much more than teaching a raw recruit how to become a basically
trained Marine.45 It ultimately became a transformation process that
indelibly imprinted a code of ethics, an ethos, upon his heart, forever.46
That actual transformation remains above description, the product though
does not--it s simply called, United States MARINE.
The Warrior Ethos
Big concepts are simple ideas understood by all, so the short
answer to my definition of a warrior is Marine.47
Colonel Michael O. Fallon
Every generation of Marines boasts as being the
best . . . as for warrior culture, that is a
phrase that post-dates me. Marines were Marines
were Marines and they fought well whenever and
wherever they were told. There was no need for rhetorical
modifiers.48
It is important to recognize that individuals are all called
Marines from the moment he or she graduates boot camp or Officer
Candidate School. However, that name means many things to many people.
It is often held synonymous with words like honor, courage, commitment,
standards of excellence, professionalism, prestige, marksmanship, and
valor, as well as nicknames such as Devil Dog, Leatherneck, and
Jarhead. 49 But one phrase remains singular among Marines regardless of
occupation, and that is, every Marine a rifleman. 50
45
Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 6-11D, Sustaining The
Transformation (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 28 June
1999), 24. Cited hereafter as MCRP 6-11D.
46
MCRP 6-11D, forward.
47
Colonel Michael O. Fallon, USMC (Ret.), e-mail interview by
author, 6 January 2002.
48
Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.), e-mail
interview by author, 7 January 2002.
49
MCRP 6-11D, forward.
15
Since the 1980 s, the term warrior seems to have come in vogue
and is often misused in describing what Marines are.51 The term warrior
is not a replacement name for Marine. To those who understand and truly
appreciate the process involved in making Marines, the term simply means
keeping the right focus as Marines.52 Marines come from diverse
backgrounds and have different occupations, yet they all claim the same
title. What that means is that they are all warfighters, first and
foremost, not just employees doing their job. A Marine gets that ethos
instilled in him or her during training at Boot Camp, or at Officer
Candidate School (OCS) and The Basic School (TBS).53 As Colonel Robert P.
Wagner recently commented, That is the common thread that runs through
Marines, that s what makes Marines unique for one thing as that we re the
only service that has those two sources as a common starting point, and
it doesn t matter what your MOS is. 54 It is critically important that
Marines do not use the term warrior as a qualifier as to who or who is
not a Marine warfighter. Although Marines speak of developing or having
a warrior mentality, that does not mean a Marine is not a warfighter . .
. [a]ll Marines are warfighters by definition. 55
50
Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: ALMAR 042/01
Establishment of the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP), 200905Z
SEP 01. Cited hereafter as ALMAR 042/01.
51
Major Paul A. Shelton, USMC, Every Marine a Warfighter,
Marine Corps Gazette 85, no. 12 (December 2001): 48. Cited hereafter as
Shelton.
52
Shelton, 48.
53
MCRP 6-11D, forward.
54
Colonel Robert P. Wagner, USMC, interview by the author, 4
January 2002.
55
Shelton, 48.
16
Post Entry-Level Training
Once a Marine graduates from recruit training or Officer Candidate
School, he/she must never consider his/her training complete. In reality
it is only just beginning. In 1939, the Marine Corps published MCO 146,
Basic Training for Enlisted Men. It made commanders responsible for
their Marine s proficiency as well as for their basic fitness.56 This
order was later superceded in 1947, by Letter of Instruction 1445, Basic
Training of Enlisted Men. It stated that,
the aim of all the required training was the establishment
and maintenance of a high level of discipline, smartness,
physical fitness, self-confidence, initiative, leadership,
and pride in the Marine Corps . . . that every Marine should
be prepared for actual combat to the extent that none shall
lack the knowledge of how to protect himself against hostile
action and how to employ individual weapons effectively
against the enemy.57
It was during this period that the Inspector General of the Marine
Corps became concerned about the state of training.58 It was identified
that commanders were not making optimal use of their time because they
had their Marines working on other projects, such as police details,
cleaning individual gear, standing inspections, or playing organized
sports instead of training.59 Training cards were thus established in an
attempt to track progress while commanders were expected to periodically
extend regular working hours in order to bring their unit up to the
standards outlined for their respective occupations in accordance with
Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1445, and later LOI 1544.60
56
Van Riper, 290, 293.
57
Van Riper, 294. Italics are the author s emphasis.
58
Van Riper, 295.
59
Van Riper, 295.
60
Van Riper, 293, 295-296.
17
Through the 1950 s and 1960 s, several more changes to LOI 1544
were promulgated based upon the premise that Marines should be doing more
training.61 Although a Physical Readiness Test was added, it was
determined that machineguns, mortars, and rockets were no longer required
subjects for all Marines and that the language stipulating all Marines be
qualified as infantrymen be removed.62 Additionally, a dilemma arose:
there was also a concern that Marines were now being asked to do too
much.63 As stated by a Headquarters Marine Corps memorandum, [t]he 59%
failure rate suffered by major commands is a direct result of an
imposition of too many training requirements. 64 It seemed the general
subjects training program had over the years become an accumulation of
tasks of which some had little to do with a particular Marine s
occupation.65 The Inspector General noted, Commanders do not have the
training time available to devote to improving individual proficiency in
a large number of subjects for which there is no requirement in the
unit s mission.66
The end result of these findings became the MCO 1510.2X series
(1956-1974), Individual Training of Enlisted Marines and the Guidebook
for Marines. 67 These listed the required essential subjects for all
61
Van Riper, 300.
62
Van Riper, 301.
63
Van Riper, 304.
64
U.S. Marine Corps, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Headquarters,
Marine Corps Memorandum A03C20-awz: Individual Training of Enlisted Men,
(Washington, D.C.: 16 April 1970), 1.
65
Van Riper, 304.
66
Van Riper, 304.
67
Van Riper, 297-298. General Order Number 10 of 1 February 1949,
classified training subjects as basic, technical, and tactical, and
listed organizations by duty categories (i.e., Recruit Depots, Fleet
18
Marines, regardless of their billet description.68 By 1991, MCO 1510.34A
Individual Training Standards (ITS) System, a
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