Research Health

Location:

Posted:

January 24, 2013

Resume:

COMMENT CORRESPONDENCE

Transmission studies which further research would includes the United States and 1. Fouchier, R. A. M. et al. Nature 481,

resume for avian flu 443 (2012).

be conducted on the laboratory- US-funded research conducted

2. Fouchier, R. A. M., Herfst, S. &

modified H5N1 viruses10,15 17. in other countries. Scientists Osterhaus, A. D. M. E. Science 335,

In January 2012, influenza virus Thus, acknowledging that should never conduct this 662 663 (2012).

3. Herfst, S., Osterhaus, A. D. M. E. &

researchers from around the the aims of the voluntary type of research without the

Fouchier, R. A. M. J. Infect. Dis. 205,

world announced a voluntary moratorium have been met in appropriate facilities, oversight 1628 1631 (2012).

pause of 60 days on any research some countries and are close and all necessary approvals. 4. Kawaoka, Y. Nature 482, 155 (2012).

involving highly pathogenic to being met in others, we We consider biosafety 5. Yen, H.-L. & Peiris, J. S. M. Nature

486, 332 333 (2012).

avian influenza H5N1 viruses declare an end to the voluntary level 3 conditions with the 6. Morens, D. M., Subbarao, K. &

leading to the generation moratorium on avian-flu considerable enhancements Taubenberger, J. K. Nature 486,

of viruses that are more transmission studies. (BSL-3+) as outlined in the 335 340 (2012).

7. Fauci, A. S. & Collins, F. S. Science

transmissible in mammals1. referenced publications11 13 to

The controversy surrounding 336, 1522 1523 (2012).

We declared a pause to this H5N1 virus-transmission be appropriate for this type of 8. WHO. Report on Technical

important research to provide research has highlighted the work, but recognize that some Consultation on H5N1 Research

Issues (WHO, 2012); available at

time to explain the public- need for a global approach to countries may require BSL-4

go.nature.com/ka2bw4.

health benefits of this work, to dealing with dual-use research conditions in accordance with 9. NSABB. Statement of the National

describe the measures in place of concern. Developing applicable standards (such as Science Advisory Board for

Biosecurity, March 2012; available

to minimize possible risks, comprehensive solutions to Canada). We fully acknowledge

at go.nature.com/fapzkh.

and to enable organizations resolve all the issues will take that this research as with any 10. Agenda for Workshop on Gain-

and governments around the time. Meanwhile, H5N1 viruses work on infectious agents is of-Function Research on Highly

Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1

world to review their policies continue to evolve in nature. not without risks. However,

Viruses, 17 18 December 2012,

(for example, on biosafety, Because H5N1 virus- because the risk exists in nature Bethesda, Maryland; available at

biosecurity, oversight and transmission studies are that an H5N1 virus capable of go.nature.com/tr7r9z.

11. Garc a-Sastre, A. mBio 3, e00049 12

communication) regarding these essential for pandemic transmission in mammals may

(2012).

experiments. preparedness and understanding emerge, the benefits of this work 12. Imai, M. et al. Nature 486, 420 428

During the past year, the the adaptation of influenza outweigh the risks. (2012).

Ron A. M. Fouchier Erasmus

benefits of this important viruses to mammals, researchers 13. Herfst, S. et al. Science 336,

1534 1541 (2012).

Medical Center, Rotterdam, the

research have been explained who have approval from their 14. WHO. Guidance on risk control

clearly in publications2 7 and Netherlands.

governments and institutions measures for H5N1 transmission

meetings8 10. Measures to Adolfo Garc a-Sastre Icahn

to conduct this research safely, research, July 2012; available at

go.nature.com/4z4yzg.

School of Medicine at Mount

mitigate the possible risks of the under appropriate biosafety and

15. Public Health Agency of Canada.

work have been detailed11 13. The Sinai, New York, USA.

biosecurity conditions, have a Advisory on Transmissible H5N1

Yoshihiro Kawaoka* University

World Health Organization has public-health responsibility to Viruses, 1 February 2012; available

at go.nature.com/jfutoz.

of Wisconsin Madison,

released recommendations on resume this important work.

16. COGEM. Letter in response to

Wisconsin, USA, and University

laboratory biosafety for those Scientists should not restart influenza research at Erasmus MC

conducting this research14, and of Tokyo, Japan.

their work in countries where, (in Dutch), 21 March 2012; available

at go.nature.com/ef5lix.

********@***.******.****.***

relevant authorities in several as yet, no decision has been

17. US Government Policy for Oversight

*On behalf of 40 co-authors

countries have reviewed the reached on the conditions of Life Sciences Dual Use Research

(see go.nature.com/ed3qkc for

biosafety, biosecurity and for H5N1 virus transmission of Concern (2012); available at

a full list).

funding conditions under research. At this time, this go.nature.com/8rkjap.

1 N AT U R E D O I : 1 0 . 1 0 3 8 / N AT U R E 1 1 8 5 8 P U B L I S H E D O N L I N E A H E A D O F P R I N T 2 3 JA N UA RY 2 0 1 3

Contact this candidate