Journal of Applied Sciences Research, *(*): *91-894, 2011
ISSN 1819-544X
This is a refereed journal and all articles are professionally screened and reviewed
ORIGINAL ARTICLES
Logical Comments on Goal Programming Approach Based on Median
Ramin Seyedi
Islamic AZAD University, Maragheh Branch, Maragheh, Iran.
ABSTRACT
In this paper we see some logical comments for Models in paper An experimental comparison of the new
goal programming and the linear programming approaches in the two-group discriminant problems, also discuss
some logical notes about the modelling and other primal subjects.
Key words: Goal programming; Linear programming; Classification, Model selection.
Introduction
Hasan Bal, Hasan orkcu and Salih Celebioglu in the paper (Bal, 2006) consider a newlinear programming
and two goal programming models for two-group classification problems. When these approaches are applied
to the data of real life or ofsimulation, proposed new models perform well both in separating the groups andthe
group membership predictions of new objects. In discriminant analysis somelinear programming models
determine the attribute weights and the cut-off valuein two steps, but suggested models determine simultaneously
all of these valuesin one step. Moreover, the results of simulation experiments show that suggested proposed
models outperform significantly than existing linear programming and statistical approaches in attaining higher
average hit ratios. Deductive logic explicates the notion of a valid argument and develops a formalism how to
discern valid inferences that preserve the truth in passing from the premises to the conclusions. Then the
premises logically entail the conclusion .Hence, deductive logic studies principles and criteria of truth-preserving
inference.It is a formal science in the sense that the meaning of the symbols does not affect soundness or
validity of the conclusions. Inductive logic tries to generalize the idea of logical entailment to inferences where
the truth of the premises doesnot guarantee the truth of the conclusions. Still, the truth of the premises might
indicate the truth of the conclusion, and it is the point of inductive logic to make the vague and informal notion
of truth-indication more precise. The central concepts become confirmation and evidential support: it is not
asked whether the premises logically entail the conclusion but whether they give good reasons toassert the
conclusion and to which degree they support it. In particular, inductive logic is supposed to quantify the effects
of observation and measurement on the epistemic status of general hypotheses and theories. Most empirical
science sinfer from data to general hypotheses, and as deductive relations between the oryand evidence seldom
hold, the degree of support is of particular interest. There inductive logic comes into play, figuring out which
hypotheses are best confirmed by the data. Usually, inductive reasoning in science proceeds along the lines of
the mathematical theory of probability. A probabilistic entailment has the general form
where and i denote sentences of a given language and y and xi denote the corresponding probabilities. In
particular, y denotes the posterior probability which the premises sentences with a given probability impose on
the conclusion .Many frequentist techniques are highly sensitive to underlying assumptions so that human
expertise and scientific understanding are required for a sensible implementation. Consequently, I conclude that
statistics mainly addresses practical worries about using data in making decisions, predicting events or describing
the mechanisms of a system. More precisely, statistics contains a patchwork of different approaches.
Corresponding Author: RAMIN SEYEDI, Islamic AZAD University, Maragheh Branch, Maragheh, Iran.
E-mail: *******@***-********.**.**
J. Appl. Sci. Res., 7(6): 891-894, 2011 892
Choosing one of them is highly sensitive to modelling assumptions, specification of goals, error tolerance
etc., and there are no conclusive arguments for a particular method. Hence, comparison of different methods
is only possible relative to far-reaching assumptions, blurring the prospects for conceptual unification of
statistics. The way how genuinely scientific insights enter the statistical model analysis suggests that statistics
resembles an empirical science more than a sophisticated inductive logic. This claim can be substantiated by
the numerical turn in statistics: computer-based design of statistical methods and their simulation-based
evaluation become more and more important.(Gilani 2002; Fitelson, 2005; Akaike,)
2. LCM Model and LPMED Models:
From paper (Burnham, 1998), we can see that Linear programming models and many of the others
determine the attribute weights and cut-off value. And divide the process of their model into two steps: the first
constitutes the determination of attribute weights, and the second determines the cut-off value for the
classification. In its first step their model makes use of an objective function minimizing the sum of deviations
from the group mean classification scores. The LCM model can be formulated as follows:
s.t.
Where ), are unrestricted variables.
By this model, wj (j = 1,2 k ), the attribute weights are found, and then the object scores are obtained.
In this model, it is reached to the weights by making object scores close to their group mean scores. And then
the object scores are used in the following model, and the classification is made:
s.t.
where hi $ 0, (i = 1,2 n) and c is an unrestricted variable. LCM model, minimizes the sum of individual
deviations of the classification scores from their group mean classification scores. Instead of the mean, we can
use the median in their model (Burnham, 1998), because the median is the point that minimizes the total
l1!norm distance from all points to it. And this model based on median is called as the LPMED. This LPMED
model minimizes the deviations of individual classification scores from their group median classification scores
in a two-group classification problem. Similar to the LCM model, the LPMED model formulated as follows:
s.t.
J. Appl. Sci. Res., 7(6): 891-894, 2011 893
Where ) are unrestricted variables
and med1,j is the median of the jth variable in G1 and med2,j is the median of the jth variable in G2. In this
model, in the first step the weights wj are found after the solution to the LPMED1. Here the weights are found
by making the object classification scores close to their group median scores. Using these weights the
classification scores for each object are evaluated and then the assignment of objects to groups are made by the
following the LPMED2 model:
s.t.
Where hi $ 0, (i = 1,2 n) and c is an unrestricted variable. Like in LCM models, the classification is made
in two independent steps. (Bal, 2006; Bajgier, 1982; Sueyoshi, 1999).
3. Logical Comments on Model Selection:
A lot of the modern debate in statistics and applied sciences focuses on the issue of model selection how
to filter a set of candidate models as to obtain a predictively successful and explanatorily helpful model. To
select a model which can be used in further study of the phenomena is such an important decision that we ought
to treat it as an integral part of statistical inference. Model selection thus involves the fitting of models to
empirical data as well as decisions on the complexity of the model and finding the causally relevant factors.
A suitable selection strategy has to evaluate the model selection uncertainty, i.e. to account for the problem that
the same data which are used for selecting a model family are also used for fitting the model and estimating
the parameters which leads to undue optimism towards the selected model. This problem, sometimes also called
selection bias, is a serious problem for statistical inference Statisticians admit this privately, but they(we)
continue to ignore the difficulties because it is not clear what else could or should be done To base statistical
inference on several sensible candidate models is a natural attempt to mitigate the problem. This is the rationale
of model averaging: Instead of using a single fitted model as the basis of statistical inference, the inference is
based on an average of all candidate models. The subsequent discussion of model selection methods show that
satisfactory inference methods are highly sensitive to prior assumptions, goals of inference and substantial
scientific insights into the underlying process. Statistical methods are optimal only relative to a variety of
external, pragmatic factors: Which types of error do we want to address? What are the practical consequences
of a fallacious inference? What is the structure of the random error? Do we have nested or non-nested, linear
or non-linear models? And so forth. It turns out to be impossible to make a neat separation between the logical
and the decision-theoretic part in statistical inference. Statistics must not be described as a branch of
mathematics that miraculously transforms messy data and vague assumptions into a trustworthy posterior
distribution. This would neglect the many uncertainties in the process. Instead, statistics seems to be much closer
to empirical work and scientific modelling: The most interesting and fruitful questions about models in science
deal with the interplay of scientific inquiry and mathematical modelling. Being able to address such questions
with the help of statistical tools has yielded an incredible progress, making statistics an indispensable part of
empirical science.
J. Appl. Sci. Res., 7(6): 891-894, 2011 894
These questions are beyond the realms of formal theories of inference as inductive logic.(Sprenger, 2009)
The theoretical properties which we can deduce about a model like LCM and LPMED, do not decide alone over
its adequacy. There are a lot of different error types, and none of the available model selection criteria takes
care of all of them. Instead, simulations that resemble typical applications are used in order to study the
properties of the proposed criterion. They help us to see whether the criterion is sufficiently robust and
applicable in a variety of circumstances. In particular, it is important to check whether the constraints given by
the intended application are adequately transformed to the parameters of the simulation (e.g. number of candidate
models, linearity, etc.). This evaluation of the model selection criteria has a quasi-empirical character, and due
to the increasing computer power, such approaches become more and more popular. In particular, the results
of the simulation analysis can lead to the introduction of adhoc information criteria that are adapted to model
selection under specific circumstances.
It should be clear by now that a solution of the model selection problem is more than the solution of an
intricate mathematical problem. Human expertise is required to decide which form of modelling is most
appropriate. It is clear that these priorities must be set by scientists, not by mathematicians. Only they
understand the objects of mathematical modelling sufficiently well to assess the adequacy of a particular
discrepancy function or the importance of model parsimony in the relevant context.
The results thus suggest a close collaboration between mathematically minded statisticians and working
scientists in order to find the most adequate model selection method in a particular problem. Indeed, this is the
route statistics has taken in the last decade, with a lot of statistical literature stemming from researchers that are
not located in a mathematics or statistics department. The increased interest in statistical methods among
researchers whose primary interests are outside mathematics and statistics shows that a crucial point has been
realized: In order to design efficient and helpful statistical methods, scientific understanding and mathematical
sophistication have to go hand in hand. It turns out to be impossible to make a neat separation between the
logical and the decision-theoretic part in statistical inference. Statistics must not be described as a branch of
mathematics that miraculously transforms messy data and vague assumptions into a trustworthy posterior
distribution. This would neglect the many uncertainties in the process. Instead, statistics seems to be much closer
to empirical work and scientific modelling: The most interesting and fruitful questions about models in science
deal with the interplay of scientific inquiry and mathematical modelling. Being able to address such questions
with the help of statistical tools has yielded an incredible progress, making statistics an indispensable part of
empirical science. These questions are beyond the realms of formal theories of inference as inductive logic.
(Sprenger, 2009; Zucchini, 2000)
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