Psychological Review Copyright **** by the American Psychological Association
****, ***. ***, **. *, 439-***-****-295X/06/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0033-295X.113.3.439
Value From Hedonic Experience and Engagement
E. Tory Higgins
Columbia University
Recognizing that value involves experiencing pleasure or pain is critical to understanding the psychology
of value. But hedonic experience is not enough. I propose that it is also necessary to recognize that
strength of engagement can contribute to experienced value through its contribution to the experience of
motivational force an experience of the intensity of the force of attraction to or repulsion from the value
target. The subjective pleasure/pain properties of a value target influence strength of engagement, but
factors separate from the hedonic properties of the value target also influence engagement strength and
thus contribute to the experience of attraction or repulsion. These additional sources of engagement
strength include opposition to interfering forces, overcoming personal resistance, using the right or
proper means of goal pursuit, and regulatory fit between the orientation and manner of goal pursuit.
Implications of the contribution of engagement strength to value are discussed for judgment and decision
making, persuasion, and emotional experiences.
Keywords: value, motivation, pleasure and pain, engagement, decision making, emotion
What is value? Where does value come from? For centuries, sources of engagement strength that provides new insights on what
these questions have been central to understanding people s mo- is value and how it is created.
tivation and decision making. Not surprisingly, there have been What is meant by something having value to someone? Accord-
many different answers to these questions, including that value is ing to the Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, Vol.
the experience of pleasure and pain (for a review, see Higgins, in II (p. 3587) and the Webster s Collegiate Dictionary (p. 1303), to
press). I propose that value is, indeed, a hedonic experience, but it value something is to estimate or appraise it in respect of value.
is not only that. It is also an experience of motivational force But what is the value being estimated or appraised? These
experiencing the force of attraction toward something or repulsion dictionaries define value in two basic ways:
away from something. Because it is a motivational force and not
1. That amount of some commodity, medium of exchange,
only a hedonic experience, there can be contributions to the overall
and so forth, that is considered to be an equivalent for
experience of value other than hedonic experience. Specifically, I
something else. A fair return or equivalent in goods,
propose that strength of engagement contributes to the intensity of
services, or money. The material or monetary worth of a
the motivational force experience the intensity of attraction to or
thing; marketable price.
repulsion from something. The hedonic properties of a value target
contribute to engagement strength, but there are also other fac-
2. The relative status of a thing, or the estimate in which it
tors separate from the target s hedonic properties that influence
is held, according to its real or supposed worth, useful-
engagement strength and thus contribute to the intensity of attrac-
ness, or importance; degree of excellence.
tion or repulsion. Because their contribution derives from their
effect on engagement strength, these additional factors can con-
There is considerable agreement between these dictionaries in
tribute to a value target s attractiveness or repulsiveness regardless
their definitions of value. It is noteworthy that the first, primary
of whether they themselves are pleasant or unpleasant. For exam-
definition of value defines the value of something as its monetary
ple, the unpleasant experience of opposing an interfering force
worth or marketable price. This type of definition provides a useful
while moving toward a positive target, such as removing a barrier
operational definition of value but it does not say what value is
that is blocking the path to a goal, can intensify the target s
psychologically. What exactly is this value that people will
attractiveness. It is the contribution to value of these additional
exchange money for? The second definition of value as worth,
usefulness, and importance degree of excellence is the kind of
definition that is explored more deeply in this article.
E. Tory Higgins, Department of Psychology and Department of Busi- Value as degree of excellence has often been treated in terms of
ness, Columbia University, New York. beliefs and inferential judgments. When people talk about their
The research reported in this article was supported by Grant 39429 from personal values or the values that others hold, they usually have in
the National Institute of Mental Health to E. Tory Higgins. I am grateful to
mind value as people s personal standards or beliefs about what is
Marilynn Brewer, Joel Brockner, Per Hedberg, Peter Herman, Arie
desirable. In a clear statement of this viewpoint, Rokeach (1980, p.
Kruglanski, Walter Mischel, Thane Pittman, Clive Seligman, and Ed Smith
262) describes values as shared prescriptive or proscriptive be-
for their helpful comments and suggestions on a draft of this article.
liefs about ideal modes of behavior and end-states of existence.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to E. Tory
This viewpoint emphasizes shared beliefs about both desired ob-
Higgins, Department of Psychology, Schermerhorn Hall, Columbia Uni-
jectives or endstates and desired procedures or means for attaining
versity, New York, NY 10027. E-mail: ****@*****.********.***
439
HIGGINS
440
& Robinson, 2003; Eisenberger, 1972; Olds & Milner, 1954;
and maintaining them (see Merton, 1957; Rokeach, 1973, 1979;
Woodworth & Schlosberg, 1954; for a review, see Higgins, in
Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Seligman, Olson, &
press). Basic hedonic experiences have been emphasized in influ-
Zanna, 1996; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler & Lind, 1992).
ential models of animal learning and performance (e.g., Miller,
Value has also been conceptualized in terms of the relationship
1963; Mowrer, 1960; Spence, 1958), attitudes and moods (Eagly &
between a current state and some endstate functioning as a stan-
Chaiken, 1993; Schwarz & Clore, 1996), decision making (e.g.,
dard or reference point, where approaching desired endstates and
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Lopes, 1987), and emotions (e.g.,
avoiding undesired endstates has value. This viewpoint is found in
Diener & Emmons, 1984; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989;
cybernetic and control process models (e.g., Bandura, 1986;
Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Roseman, 1984; Russell, 1980;
Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1990; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960;
see also Spinoza 1677/1986; Wundt, 1896/1999).
Powers, 1973; Wiener, 1948), self-concept models (Boldero &
In sum, hedonic experiences of pleasure and pain have been
Francis, 2002; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Higgins, 1987; James,
proposed by many as being basic to value. I agree that hedonic
1890/1948; Rogers, 1961), and social comparison models (Cialdini
experience makes a critical contribution to value. I also believe,
et al., 1976; Hyman, 1942; Merton & Kitt, 1952; Tesser, 1988).
however, that hedonic experience is not the whole story and that
There are also times when people infer what the value of some-
there is another variable that contributes to value strength of
thing is to them by observing their own behaviors, thoughts, or
engagement.
feelings toward it and treating these cues as evidence for its value
to them, similar to what they would do when observing the
behavior of others to infer the value of something to them
Hedonic Experience and Strength of Engagement
(Andersen, 1984; Bem, 1965, 1967; Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis,
1965; Kruglanski, 1975; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973; Salan-
In conceptualizing value, my starting point is the position of
cik & Conway, 1975; Schachter & Singer, 1962; Schwarz & Clore,
Kurt Lewin. For Lewin (1951), value is a force that has direction
1988).
and strength. Lewin (1951) had in mind forces on a person s life
Historically, the cognitive sources of value that I have just
space that were analogous to natural physical forces on objects
described correspond to the prevalent philosophical view of value
rather than something that a person experiences. I follow Lewin s
that involves using reason and reflection to create an objective
(1951) lead but postulate a force experience that has direction and
basis for determining what is good or bad (Haidt, 2001; Williams,
strength or intensity. Experiencing something as having positive
1985). What has received less emphasis from this viewpoint is the
value corresponds to experiencing attraction toward it (i.e., trying
notion of value as experience. Indeed, value as experience is not
to move in the direction toward it), and experiencing something as
explicitly mentioned in dictionary definitions of value. Nonethe-
having negative value corresponds to experiencing repulsion from
less, conceptualizing value in terms of experience has a long
it (i.e., trying to move in a direction away from it).
history in the psychological and philosophical literatures.
The term hedonic, which derives from the Greek term for
sweet, means relating to or characterized by pleasure (Webster s Hedonic Experience and Motivational Force Experience
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1989, p. 561). Historically, as Distinct Sources of Value
value experiences have been most often associated with hedonic
experiences. From the time of the Greeks, hedonic experiences The directional component of the value force experience (i.e.,
have been linked to the classic motivational principle that people attraction vs. repulsion) is critical to the psychology of value. This
approach pleasure and avoid pain. Our understanding of the sub- is why the hedonic experiences of pleasure or pain are so important
jective experience of pleasure and pain has deepened (e.g., Kah- (see Kahneman et al., 1999). Cognitive sources of value can also
neman & Tversky, 1979), and psychologists interest in hedonic influence the experience of direction. For example, shared beliefs
experiences has never been greater (see Kahneman, Diener, & about what is desirable and what is undesirable both social
Schwarz, 1999). values and personal ideals and oughts directly determine what
In an early statement on the importance of hedonic experiences has positive value and what has negative value. The evidence used
to value, Jeremy Bentham (1781/1988, p.1) stated: Nature has to make evaluative inferences also provides directional informa-
placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, tion about the positive or negative value of something (e.g., Bem s
pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought self-perception theory). But value experiences have more than
to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. Kahneman (2000) direction. They also vary in strength or intensity so that the
points out that the concept of utility has different meanings. One, experience of attraction can be relatively weak or strong (low or
decision utility, is like the primary dictionary definition of value high positive value), and the experience of repulsion can be rela-
described earlier in its being an operational (i.e., behavioristic) tively weak or strong (low or high negative value). The contribu-
definition utility is inferred from observed choices. The second tion of strength of engagement to the value force experience is not
meaning reflects Bentham s perspective on utility as experiences through an influence on direction but through its influence on the
of pleasure and pain and is called experienced utility by intensity of attraction or repulsion. As will be seen, the hedonic
Kahneman. nature of a value target also contributes to value intensity through
Do animals value something as a function of whether it satisfies its impact on engagement strength, but it is not the only determi-
their biological needs or will they choose something simply be- nant of engagement strength. The purpose of this article is to
cause it provides hedonic pleasure experiences? There is clear highlight the contribution to engagement strength, and thus to
evidence that animals will choose on the basis of value experiences value intensity, from sources other than the value target s hedonic
independent of any biological need being satisfied (e.g., Berridge properties.
VALUE FROM HEDONIC EXPERIENCE AND ENGAGEMENT 441
Figure 1 provides a summary of the overall proposal that I influence, such as whether it monotonic or nonmonotonic. As we
develop in this article. The purpose of the figure is simply to shall see, the relationship between hedonic experience and moti-
provide a visual representation of what I propose below regarding vational force experience is not a simple monotonic relationship.
the connections among the variables that contribute to the value My discussion of the proposal illustrated in Figure 1 will move
force experience. I wish to note a few points about the figure. from right to left. To begin with, I propose that there are two
First, not all possible relationships among the variables in the distinct sources of the value experience. One source is the hedonic
figure are shown. Only those relationships that I will emphasize pleasure/pain experience of the target. As discussed earlier, it has
and discuss below are included. For example, Figure 1 does not been recognized for centuries that pleasure has associated with it
show an influence of strength of engagement on how the pleasure/ an approach motivation and that pain has associated with it an
pain properties of a value target are experienced. This should not avoidance motivation the classic hedonic principle. I propose,
be taken as a claim that there is no such influence. It simply means however, that there is a second source of the value experience that
that the model is currently silent about what this influence might does not involve the hedonic experience of pleasure or pain per se
be. In each case, the absence of an indicated relationship in the but rather involves the experience of the motivational force to
figure should be understood in this way the model is currently make something happen (experienced as a force of attraction) or
silent about the influence. As new research evidence is collected make something not happen (experienced as a force of repulsion).
and the theory develops, new influences will be added to the Although the hedonic experience and the motivational force ex-
model. The current model, for instance, shows only strength of perience often are experienced holistically, conceptually they are
engagement and hedonic experience as factors contributing to the distinct from one another. Some activity that provides little hedo-
motivational force experience, but other factors could contribute to nic pleasure, for example, may have a strong motivational force
this experience as well. As another example, it is likely that associated with it because it is the proper thing to do or matches
hedonic outcomes themselves contribute to strength of engage- shared beliefs about appropriate procedures of goal pursuit I
ment, such as success or failure in a goal pursuit activity affecting don t enjoy doing this but I feel compelled to do it. Empirical
subsequent strength of engagement in that activity (see, e.g., Idson, evidence of the distinct contributions to value from the hedonic
Liberman, & Higgins, 2004). As the model becomes more dy- pleasure/pain experience and the motivational force experience is
namic and considers value creation and strength of engagement provided below.
over time, it will become important to consider the relationship Although distinct, the hedonic experience and the motivational
between outcomes and strength of engagement. force experience affect one another, as noted by the bidirectional
Second, when an influence between variables is shown, it sim- link between them in Figure 1. The precise nature of their inter-
ply reflects the proposal that one variable has an effect on the relationship is not well known, however, perhaps because the
other. No claim is being made about the precise nature of the literature has rarely distinguished between them as sources of
Figure 1. Illustration of proposed relational influences among variables contributing to the value force
experience.
HIGGINS
442
value experience. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to postulate ence itself has an intensity factor from the guiding drive stimulus
that hedonic experience would affect motivational force experi- (level of food), the energizing state (level of hunger), and their
ence, with the intensity of the force to make something happen interaction. Later I discuss how, separate from this hedonic inten-
increasing as its pleasantness increases and the intensity of the sity factor, strength of engagement makes an additional contribu-
force to make something not happen increasing as its painfulness tion to the experience of value intensity.
increases. It is also reasonable to postulate that motivational force It is not only the perceiver s need or goal state that influences
experience would affect hedonic experience, albeit perhaps not in how a target s properties are hedonically experienced. It is also
a simple way. For example, when a desire to do something be- well known that the experience of a target s properties is influ-
comes a compulsion to do it, that is, experienced too strongly as a enced by the situation or context in which they are perceived (e.g.,
motivational force to make it happen, the activity might become Kohler, 1929; Koffka, 1935; Lewin, 1951; for a review, see Ross
less enjoyable. Future research is clearly needed to investigate the & Nisbett, 1990). For example, people consider the value of
nature of this proposed bidirectional relation. something in relation to whatever factual standard is currently
In sum, what is critical here is the notion that value is not just available or accessible to them, which can vary as a function of
an experience of pleasure or pain but an experience of the force of context (Higgins, Strauman, & Klein, 1986). The value of some-
attraction toward or repulsion away from something. Value in- thing can be assimilated toward or contrasted away from the
volves an experience of the intensity of a motivational force and context of current alternatives (Helson, 1964; Higgins & Stangor,
not just a directional experience of pleasure versus pain. Although 1988). It can vary depending on which mental account the context
the hedonic nature of a value target contributes to the intensity suggests is appropriate for calculating its value (Thaler, 1999) or
experience through its influence on engagement strength, there are on what the context suggests is normal (Kahneman & Miller,
other sources of engagement strength that are independent of the 1986) or might have happened instead (Kahneman & Tversky,
value target s hedonic properties. Let us now consider in more 1982; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Roese, 1997).
detail these various sources of the value force experience. Let us now consider the sources of motivational force experi-
ences. As was discussed earlier, one source of motivational force
experience is the pleasure/pain hedonic experience. This source
Sources of Hedonic Experience and Sources of
has so dominanted analyses of motivation that other sources have
Motivational Force Experience
not received serious attention. As shown in Figure 1, a novel
feature of the present model is the proposal that strength of
Let us now move further left in Figure 1 to the sources of
engagement is another source one that contributes to the inten-
hedonic experience and the sources of motivational force experi-
sity, but not to the direction, of the motivational force experience.
ence. I begin with the subjective properties of a value target as a
The state of being engaged is to be involved, occupied, and
source of pleasure/pain hedonic experience. The subjective prop-
interested in something. Strong engagement is to concentrate on
erties of a value target (present or anticipated), given the current
something, to be absorbed or engrossed with it. Historically,
need or goal state of the perceiver, elicit or induce pleasure or pain
strength of engagement relates to the notion that people can be
of varying strengths. I want to highlight that when I use the phrase
interested in something independent of its hedonic valence, and
need or goal state I am referring not only to physiological needs
that this has value implications. Perry (1926), for example, said
or drives emphasized in the traditional psychological literature but
that an object is valuable when interest is taken in it. Ziff (1960)
also to goals, standards, shared values, and other desired endstates
said that good means answering to certain interests. Mandler
(see Lewin, 1935, 1951). It has long been recognized that pleasure
(1984) noted that what makes us attend to things also invests them
or pain of varying strengths to the properties of some target is not
with value and events that are interesting may or may not be
a function solely of the target s objective properties. It is the
positively valued. Berlyne (1973) also distinguished interesting
target s subjective properties that are critical. People do not simply
from pleasing or pleasant. Although no explicit distinction was
react to some property. They assign meaning or significance to an
made between pleasure/pain experience and strength of engage-
object s property as a function of their current need or goal state
ment, such discussions relating the value of things to being ab-
and then respond to that meaning or significance (Weber, 1967).
sorbed or occupied with them, independent of their valence, might
What is critical is the dynamic relationship between the specific
have reflected an implicit appreciation for the importance of
perceiver and specific target (Lewin, 1935, 1951).
strength of engagement as a source of value independent of va-
Hedonic pleasure/pain experience, therefore, derives not only
lence. More recently, discussions of people s experience of their
from the properties of something but also from the need or goal
life happiness or value have distinguished between value from
state of the perceiver. In classic theories of learning (Hull, 1943;
pleasure and pain experiences and value from strength of engage-
Miller & Dollard, 1941), for example, a distinction was made
ment (e.g., Seligman, 2004).
between the drive stimulus that guides the direction of movement
What is different between the present model and these proposals
and the perceiver s drive that energizes the movement. Discussing
is that the present model distinguishes explicitly between the
the perceiver s drive state, Hebb (1955, p. 249) said . . . drive is
impact of engagement strength on one s own personal experience
an energizer, but not a guide; an engine, but not a steering gear.
of what one is doing versus its impact on the value of something
People differ chronically in the level of their energizing drive
else (see also later discussion of flow ). In the present model, the
states, such as hunger, and a given person will vary in his or her
critical property of engagement for value creation is the strength of
energizing drives states from situation to situation or moment to
the engagement rather than whether the engagement activity itself
moment. The guiding drive stimulus, such as food, also varies in
happens to be pleasant or unpleasant. It is possible, for example, to
strength as a function of the stimulus own properties. The point I
be engaged strongly in a goal pursuit of some value target despite
want to emphasize here is that the component of hedonic experi-
VALUE FROM HEDONIC EXPERIENCE AND ENGAGEMENT 443
about their subjective response to the target s properties rather than
its being unpleasant as an activity or to disengage from the goal
some extraneous source of engagement strength like those shown
pursuit despite its being pleasant as an activity. What matters for
on the bottom left of Figure 1 (the aboutness principle; see
value creation is the strength of the engagement, which contributes
Higgins, 1998). This would make it likely that other sources of
to the intensity of the motivational force experience of the value
engagement strength would be overlooked by scholars and layper-
target. For instance, individuals could experience as unpleasant
sons alike, and that the emphasis would be on hedonic experience
their opposition to forces interfering with their pursuit of a positive
alone. Nonetheless, there are additional sources of engagement
value target (e.g., the effort needed to remove an obstacle), but this
strength that are extraneous to the value target s hedonic proper-
condition of opposition, by increasing engagement strength, could
ties, as shown on the bottom left of Figure 1. Before beginning a
intensify their attraction to the positive target. Conversely, indi-
more detailed discussion of these sources, I need to make three
viduals could feel positive about pursuing a goal in the right way,
additional points.
but this condition of regulatory fit, by increasing engagement
First, although Figure 1 shows only four factors opposition to
strength, could intensify their repulsion from a negative value
interfering forces, overcoming personal resistance, regulatory fit,
target.
and use of proper means this is not meant to imply that these are
Studies demonstrating both of the above phenomena are re-
the only extraneous sources of engagement strength. Indeed, later
viewed later. An everyday example of these kinds of effects occurs
I will discuss the possibility that conditions that produce arousal or
when academics review papers for potential publication. The re-
activation in excitation transfer (or misattribution) studies might
viewing process itself could be experienced as pleasant or unpleas-
also increase strength of engagement in a way that is independent
ant, but in either case the reviewers could be highly engaged in
of the value target s hedonic properties. I will also discuss how
what they are doing. According to the present model, the review-
high outcome expectancy or likelihood might also increase
ers attraction to a paper they like and repulsion from a paper they
strength of engagement. Indeed, there may be still other sources of
dislike will be more intense under conditions that make the re-
engagement strength that have yet to be identified. The four factors
viewers more strongly engaged in the review process, and this will
shown in Figure 1 were selected for special attention because they
be true both when the reviewing process itself is pleasant and when
provide a challenge to traditional, purely hedonic conceptions of
the reviewing process itself is unpleasant.
value and because the conditions that induce them are relatively
Figure 1 acknowledges that one important source of strength of
well known.
engagement is the subjective pleasure/pain properties of the value
Second, like the hedonic properties of a value target, strength of
target. Generally speaking, people tend to engage with something
engagement depends on the need or goal state of the perceiver.
more strongly when it is pleasant than when it is painful. However,
Need or goal states play a role in strength of engagement just as in
if something painful requires paying more attention to it in order to
experiencing a target s hedonic properties. Third, again compara-
take effective action, as may occur with something threatening,
ble to the hedonic properties of a value target, strength of engage-
then it can produce strong engagement. Future research is needed
ment depends on the situational conditions of the target engage-
to determine the precise nature of the relationship between the
ment, as will be seen below.
subjective pleasure/pain properties of the value target and engage-
ment strength.
As shown in Figure 1, the subjective pleasure/pain properties of Sources of Engagement Strength Extraneous to the Value
the value target have two effects one on hedonic experience and
Target s Hedonic Properties
another on strength of engagement. The effect on hedonic experi-
ence involves both direction and strength, whereas the effect on I discuss in this section four sources of engagement strength
strength of engagement involves only strength. It is likely that shown in Figure 1 opposition to interfering forces, overcoming
varying the subjective pleasure/pain properties of the value target personal resistance, regulatory fit, and use of proper means. Other
will have different consequences for the magnitude of the hedonic potential sources will be discussed later.
experience than for the strength of the engagement. Consider, for
example, alternative strategic responses to something threatening Opposition to Interfering Forces
or painful, such as paying very close attention to it or looking away
from it, or the classic coping alternatives of freezing, fainting, An important way of interacting with the environment occurs
fighting, or fleeing. As value targets threatening properties in- when people oppose forces that would make something happen
crease, the magnitude of the negative hedonic experience will they do not want to happen. Woodworth (1940), for example,
increase, but engagement strength may or may not increase. High stated that a central characteristic of people and other animals is
threat could produce high engagement, such as paying more at- that they exert considerable opposition or resistance to environ-
tention or fighting, or it could produce low engagement, such as mental forces on them in order to maintain a degree of indepen-
looking away or fainting. dence. They resist wind that is trying to blow them over and
I believe that it is the fact that experiencing a target s hedonic gravity that is trying to make them fall. They have an active
properties is a major source of engagement strength, but it is not give-and-take relationship with the environment, and value
the only source, that is critical to the thesis of the present article. springs from the individual s ability to deal effectively with some
Experiencing a value target s hedonic properties not only contrib- phase of the environment (p. 396).
utes to the direction of the value force experience, which strength When individuals oppose interfering forces, they oppose some-
of engagement does not, but often it is a major determinant of thing that would hinder, impede, or obstruct a preferred state or
strength of engagement as well. It is natural for people to experi- course of action. They oppose a choice situation that would force
ence the contribution of engagement strength to value as being them to select from an impoverished set of alternatives. This
HIGGINS
444
and opposition to this force increases strength of engagement.
opposition can create value. Lewin (1935), for example, described
Given that the participants may be assumed to begin with a
how it was natural for children to assert themselves in an opposi-
positive attitude toward their own belief, the increase in strength of
tional way to an adult prohibition or command that would interfere
engagement should increase the intensity of this positively valued
with their free movement, thereby increasing the value of their
belief.
activity. Indeed, Lewin (1935) considered such value creation
One variable that can be conceptualized as an interfering force
from opposition to interfering forces to be a realm of fundamental
is difficulty. Lewin (1935, 1951) described a force that impedes or
psychological significance.
obstructs locomotion or progress to a goal as a barrier or dif-
Value creation from opposition to interfering forces or pressure
ficulty. The difficulty can be an actual physical object blocking
is illustrated in social psychological research on reactance theory
progress, such as a bench blocking a child s path toward obtaining
(Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Wicklund, 1974). Reac-
a toy (e.g., Lewin, 1935), or it can be an authority figure s
tance theory concerns people s belief that they can significantly
prohibition of some act, or it can be the complexity of some task,
control their own destiny, and that they are free to act, believe, or
and so on. As Lewin (1935) points out, psychologically such a
feel as they see fit. It states that when a (subjectively important)
difficulty, be it physical or social, constitutes a barrier in our
freedom is threatened with elimination or is actually eliminated,
terms an interfering force.
people will react so as to protect or restore that freedom. In a study
It is important to emphasize that individuals may or may not
by Brehm, Stires, Sensenig, and Shaban (1966), participants lis-
oppose such interfering forces. Individuals sometimes choose not
tened to a taped selection from four different records for which
to engage in a difficult activity, or if they choose to engage, they
they then provided a preference ranking. They were told that they
may quit or give up at some point. In such cases, difficulty does
would receive a complimentary record when the actual records
not increase strength of engagement. Thus, one would not predict
arrived the next day, either randomly selected (for half the partic-
a simple monotonic positive relationship between difficulty and
ipants) or selected by themselves (for the other half). When they
strength of engagement. One might be tempted to predict a bell-
later arrived to pick up the complimentary record, half of the
shaped relation between difficulty and strength of engagement, but
participants learned that their third-ranked record was not included
such a prediction would overlook what it is about difficulty that
in the shipment and was thus eliminated from the choice set (the
influences strength of engagement. It is not the difficulty per se but
Choice-Elimination condition). The participants were then asked
the opposition to it that is critical. It is opposing difficulty as an
to rate again the attractiveness of all the records. The attractiveness
interfering force that increases strength of engagement. The
of the third-ranked record increased in the Choice-Elimination
amount of opposition can vary. As Brehm and Self (1989) point
condition only.
out, the effort that people put into a task depends in part on how
According to reactance theory, the underlying mechanism for
much effort is actually required to achieve their goal. Thus, dif-
value creation in this and similar studies is a motivation to reassert
ferent individuals with varying abilities will expend different
or restore a freedom that has been eliminated or threatened with
amounts of effort when engaging in a task as a function of the
elimination. In addition to this mechanism, the situation might also
amount of effort required in order to achieve success.
create value in another way. The elimination of a choice alternative
In sum, although the precise relationship between difficulty and
and the resultant pressure to make a selection from an impover-
strength of engagement is not simple, difficulty may be considered
ished option set interferes with participants preferred course of
generally as an interfering force that people will sometimes op-
action, and participants oppose this interfering force. This oppo-
pose, and when there is such opposition to difficulty as an inter-
sition should increase strength of engagement in what they are
fering force, then strength of engagement will increase. Under
doing. To the extent that receiving the to-be-eliminated record as
these conditions, difficulty will affect value. If the value target is
a gift was a positive outcome to the participants at the beginning
positive to begin with, then difficulty will intensify its positivity;
of the study, that is, their initial responses to that record were
if the value target is negative, then difficulty will intensify its
positive, then the increase in strength of engagement from oppos-
negativity. There are various studies in the psychological literature
ing an interfering force should increase that record s positive
in which the situational conditions appear to meet these criteria.
value. Studies testing Brehm s (1966) theory of reactance have
Wright (1937), for example, reports an intriguing series of studies
typically involved interfering with something participants initially
in which access to food was made more difficult by adding a
accept or like. An alternative situation would be to interfere with
barrier. In one study, the experimenter arranged plates of the same
something that individuals initially dislike and want to reject.
dessert on a serving table at various distances from where the
Opposition to the interference should once again increase strength
waitresses stood to pick them up to serve. As long as the distance
of engagement, but because the initial response to the value target
was not too great, that is, not so difficult as to make the waitresses
is negative, this time it is the negative value of the target that
not bother to try, the dessert plates further away were selected
should increase.
more than those that were closer. Another study found that kin-
There are other kinds of social psychological studies in which
dergarten children chose a more distant candy with a wire sieve
individuals oppose interfering forces. For example, in a study by
over it instead of one closer with no sieve.
Batson (1975), participants first publicly expressed a genuinely
As Lewin (1935) points out, opposition to interfering forces
held religious belief and then received information that seemed to
naturally occurs when goal-oriented activity is blocked. An espe-
disconfirm that belief. The participants who accepted the informa-
cially interesting form of such opposition is the Zeigarnik effect in
tion as accurate increased the intensity of their original religious
which a task is interrupted before completion (Lewin, 1935;
attitudes. Once again, more than one possible mechanism could
Zeigarnik, 1938). Consistent with the notion that opposition to
contribute to such an effect, but one possibility is that receiving
goal blockage as an interfering force would increase strength of
disconfirming information is experienced as an interfering force,
VALUE FROM HEDONIC EXPERIENCE AND ENGAGEMENT 445
engagement and thus enhance the value of achieving the (positive) Overcoming Personal Resistance
goal, such interruption has been found to increase the attractive-
Increased strength of engagement from opposition to interfering
ness of the interrupted task (Cartwright, 1942). Mischel and Mas-
forces occurs when individuals want to do something and yet
ters (1966) provide another early illustration of how opposition to
experience external interference when trying to do it. There are
interruption as an interfering force may intensity a positive value
also conditions when individuals themselves initially resist doing
target. In their study, an entertaining movie was interrupted by
something because it is aversive in some way, and they must
projector failure at an exciting point. A confederate posing as an
overcome their own personal resistance in order to proceed with
electrician provided different information about whether the inter-
the activity. They do something despite not wanting to do it.
ruption was or was not just temporary. When participants believed
Overcoming personal resistance also increases strength of
that the movie was unlikely to resume (i.e., their goal was
engagement.
blocked), they valued the movie more.
Value creation from overcoming personal resistance is illus-
Other kinds of opposition to interfering forces that occur during
trated in social psychological research testing cognitive dissonance
goal pursuit may also create value. For example, certain circum-
theory (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Festinger, 1957; Wicklund &
stances surrounding an activity have the potential to disrupt (or
Brehm, 1976). According to Festinger (1957), two cognitive ele-
distract one from) completing the activity. To carry out or pay full
ments, x and y, are in a dissonant relationship to one another if
attention to the focal activity, these interfering circumstances must not-x would follow from y. According to this definition, then, the
be opposed, and the opposition can create value by increasing situational conditions in which people overcome personal resis-
strength of engagement. Importantly, the interfering circumstances tance would produce a state of dissonance because the belief that
may themselves be either pleasant or unpleasant. Regardless of the doing something is aversive, y, predicts the decision not to do it
hedonic experience of the situational conditions themselves, as (not-x), but instead people overcome their resistance and do it
strength of engagement is increased by opposing these conditions, anyhow. Instead of y and not-x occurring together, which would
then the positive or negative evaluative response to the value target make sense and should happen, y and x occur together. Dissonance
itself will intensify. The classic case of this is the pleasant distrac- theory concerns people s motivation to reduce such states of
tor resistance to temptation. In studies on resistance to tempta- dissonance in order to achieve cognitive consistency (i.e., make
tion, the participants goal is to concentrate on some focal activity sense of the world), and it considers the different ways that such
and resist paying attention to an at
Copyright 2006 by the American Psychological Association