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November 17, 2012

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Salvador de

Madariaga Institute

NAFTA and the European Referent:

Labor Mobility in European and

North American Regional Integration

-Mark J. Miller and Boyka Stefanova

Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series

Vol. 3 No.1

June 2003

The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series

The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series is produced by the Jean Monnet Chair of the

University of Miami, in cooperation with the Miami European Union Center.

These monographic papers address issues relevant to the ongoing European Convention which

will conclude in the Spring of 2003. The purpose of this Convention is to submit proposals for

a new framework and process of restructuring the European Union. While the European Union

has been suc cessful in many areas of integration for over fifty years, the European Union must

take more modern challenges and concerns into consideration in an effort to continue to meet its

objectives at home and abroad. The main issues of this Convention are Europe s role in the

international community, the concerns of the European citizens, and the impending enlargement

process. In order for efficiency and progress to prevail, the institutions and decision-making

processes must be revamped without jeopardizing th e founding principles of this organization.

During the Convention proceedings, the Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Papers will attempt to

provide not only concrete information on current Convention issues but also analyze various

aspects of and actors involved in this unprecedented event.

The following is a list of tentative topics for this series:

1. The challenges of the Convention: the ability to govern a supranational Europe or the return

to intergovernmental cooperation?

2. How will the member states figure in the framework of the Convention?

3. The necessity to maintain a community method in a wider Europe.

4. Is it possible for the member states to jeopardize the results of the Convention?

5. The member states against Europe: the pressures on and warnings to the Convention by the

European capitals.

6. Is it possible that the Convention will be a failure? The effects on European integration.

7. Similarities and differences between the European Convention and the Philadelphia

Convention of 1787.

8. The role of a politically and economically integrated Europe in the governance of the world.

9. How important is European integration to the United States today?

10. The failure of a necessary partnership? Do the United States and the European Union

necessarily have to understand each other? Under what conditions?

11. Is it possible to conceive a strategic partnership between the United States, the European

Union and Russia?

12. Russia: a member of the European Union? Who would be interested in this association?

Miami European Union Center Jean Monnet Chair Staff:

University of Miami Joaqu n Roy (Director)

1531 Brescia Avenue Aimee Kanner (Editor)

Coral Gables, FL 33146-3010 Roberto Dom nguez (Research Assistant)

Phone: 305 -284-3266; Fax: 305-***-**** Nouray Ibryamova (Research Assistant)

E-Mail: abph6f@r.postjobfree.com Mariela Arenas (Research Assistant)

Webs: www.miami.edu/international -studies/euc

www.euroy.org; www.miamieuc.org

NAFTA and the European Referent: Labor Mobility in

European and North American Regional Integration

Mark J. Miller and Boyka Stefanova

The Jean Monnet Chair

University of Miami

Miami, Florida

June 2003

Mark Miller is Professor at the University of Delaware. Boyka Stefanova is a Ph.D. candidate at the

University of Delaware.

NAFTA AND THE EUROPEAN REFERENT: LABOR MOBILITY IN

EUROPEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION

The election of Vicente Fox in Mexico and of George W. Bush in the United States led

to a short-lived bilateral honeymoon in 2001 that waned prior to the terrorist attacks

of September 11, not after them. One aspect of the honeymoon period involved

recurrent allusions to a European referent for NAFTA in US and Mexican press

cove rage of a possible immigration policy initiative. In several declarations, most

notably President Fox s speech at the Ottawa summit of the NAFTA partners in 2001,

he spoke of his vision of a border -free North America where workers enjoyed freedom

of movement. The seeming European referent for NAFTA, then, was freedom of

movement within the European space guaranteed European citizens under Articles 48

and 49 of the Treaty of Rome.

If President Fox and other advocates of a US-Mexico immigration policy

initiative actually espouse an Article 48-like freedom of labor mobility within NAFTA,

they would appear to be overlooking fundamental differences between regional

integration in North America and Europe. We suggest that the Turkish-EU and

Moroccan-EU relationships constitute a more appropriate European referent for

NAFTA than Article 48. Turkish and Moroccan bids for membership in the EC and EU

failed for many reasons, but above all because of the prospect for large-scale emigration

by Turks or Moroccans to other member-states long after the end of a transition period.

Two Different Creatures

The history of European federalism pre-dates World War II. But the trauma of the

Holocaust and the vast destruction of the two world wars convinced European leaders of

a need for regional integration in order to prevent recurrence of war. Subsequent

regional integration in Europe was security-driven, and involved a European

governance project. While Europeans differed in their approaches to regional

integration, the founders of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) launched

a federalist project that was to evolve incrementally. A vision of freedom of worker or

employee mobility already informed the creation of the ECSC.1

It is important to recall, however, that Italy s strategy to facilitate emigration

through regional integration encountered great resistance from ot her member-states.2

While the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, Article 48 did not become effective until

1968. In the meantime, Italy had undergone a remarkable transformation, in large part

attributable to its membership in the European Community. By the time Italians

possessed freedom of labor mobility, they were little inclined to exercise the right.

While Italians constituted the largest group of intra -EC community workers, such

A. Geddes, Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe? (Manchester and NY:

Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 45.

F. Romero, Migration as an Issue in European Interdependence and Integration: The Case of Italy, in

A. Milward, F. Lynch, R. Ranieri, F. Romero and V. S renson (eds.), The Frontier of National

Sovereignty (London: Routledge, 1993).

workers comprised a very tiny share of the combined workforce of the EC.3 By 1990,

the foreign resident population from other EU states had grown to over 5.5 million in a

total population of 370 million, about 1 percent of the EU s total population. 4 The

relative paucity of labor mobility between member-states of the EC and the EU

contrasts strikingly with the current situation within the NAFTA area, where some eight

to nine million Mexican-born individuals reside in the United States, about half

illegally. In 1972, there were only 750,000 Mexicans resident in the US.

European regional integration largely involved the melding of societies at similar

levels of socio-economic development. The provision of deve lopment assistance to

lagging areas within the European space helped narrow socio-economic disparities, in

areas like Southern Italy which, in turn, reduced incentives for emigration under Article

48. Hence, the modest propensity to migrate for employment within the European

space, while often decried, in fact reflects an underlying socio-economic reality that has

a counterpart in the U.S.-Canadian relationship but not yet with Mexico.

NAFTA emerged in a different historical context. It was neither secur ity-driven

nor did it involve a federalist project. Instead, it extended a free -trade area created in

1988 between Canada and the United States in response to, in retrospect, exaggerated

apprehensions over the trade implications of the Single European Act. Indeed, it was

these fears that gave rise to the notion of Fortress Europe, a term now inappropriately

used to characterize EU-area migration policies. The origins of NAFTA can be traced

to the creation of the Commission for the Study of International Migration and

Cooperative Economic Development (CSIMCED) authorized by the Immigration

Reform and Control Act of 1986. Essentially, CSIMCED examined alternative or

complementary strategies for prevention of illegal migration to the one found in IRCA.

CSIMCED commissioned scores and scores of studies including one that examined the

likely effects of trade liberalization between the U nited States and Mexico upon the

agricultural sector in Mexico and Mexican emigration. It warned that tra de

liberalization would adversely affect the e jido sector of traditional small-scale farms

which employed millions of Mexicans and which sustained one third of the M exican

population. 5 Philip L. Martin would later refine his insights into a theory of a migration

hump in which emigration from Mexico to the United States would increase

significantly over the short to medium term before eventually declining over the long

term in a scenario of trade liberalization.6

President Salinas of Mexico proposed NAFTA to President George Bush,

Senior. The American president then referred the question to his National Security

Council, which supported the proposal on the grounds that the United States and

Mexico had become so interdependent, in large part due to migratio n, that untoward

developments in Mexico would adversely affect the United States.

H. Werner, Freiz gigkeit der Arbeitskr fte und die Wanderungsbewegungen in den L ndern der

Europ ischen Gemeinschaft (Nuremburg: Institut f r Arbeitsmarkt -und Berufsforschung, 2000).

R. Koslowski, Migrants and Citizens (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 118.

P.L. Martin, Trade and Migration: NAFTA and Agriculture (Washington, DC: Institute for International

Economics, 1993).

P.L Martin and J.E. Taylor, Managing Migration: The Role of Economic Policies, in A. Zolberg and

P. Benda, Global Migr ants, Global Refugees (NY: Berghahn Books, 2001).

Hence, security concerns figured in the Bush administration s embrace of the

NAFTA concept, but much less centrally than in the European regional integration

context. Moreover, the NAFTA proposal involved no explicit political project as in the

European context. NAFTA would deepen socio-economic interdependence between the

three partner states but all three jealously guarded their sovereign prerogatives. Indeed,

so sharp were differences between the United States and Mexico over illegal migration

that a decision was made to exclude the poison pill of migration from NAFTA

negotiations. Paradoxically, then, only one minor formal clause of the NAFTA treaty

pertains to migration while, in fact, migration control concerns figured centrally in the

diplomatic initiative. Indeed, both President Salinas and President Clinton would argue

in support of signature and ratification of the NAFTA treaty that it would reduce illegal

Mexican migration to the United States. To paraphrase President Salinas, either the

United States would get Mexican tomatoes or Mexican workers.

A decade after the signing of the NAFTA treaty, Mexican immigration to the

United States is surging. Preliminary analysis of the 2000 census suggests that the

proportion of illegal entrants among Mexican migrants to the United States has

increased significantly. The downward slope in the expected hump has yet to

materialize although there are Mexican experts who contend that changing demographic

and socio-economic realities in Mexico will result in decreasing Mexican emigration to

the United States soon.

In retrospect, Article 48-like freedom of movement with the NAFTA area can at

best be termed visionary. There are those who view socio-economic integration as

mechanistically or inevitably leading to spillover and deeper political integration

between governments involved in a regional integration process. However, it took the

German Question, the resultant commitme nt to regional integration to prevent

recurrence of war and a federalist project for such an outcome to materialize in the

European regional integration context. Leadership or volitional variables mattered a

great deal in the development of the EU. The unilateralist, even imperialist, dimensions

of U .S. foreign policy under George W. Bush stand in sharp contrast.

Moreover, NAFTA differs from the European regional integration process

because the United States so dwarfs Mexico economically. The difficulties encountered

by African regional integration projects like the Economic Community of West African

States (ECOWAS) in this respect are telling. Rather than socio -economic integration

resulting in deeper political integration and freedom of labor movement, mass

deportations of community workers frequently result as in the Nigerian mass expulsions

of the 1980s. 7 Aderanti Andepoju has identified the socio-economic predominance of

one member state in multi-state regional integration frameworks as a recurrent obstacle

to successful regional integration in Africa. Typically, the richest state in a regional

integration project absorbs most of the labor movement within the region which

eventually leads to political frictions, conflicts and mass expulsions, especially in

periods of economic recessions, such as experienced by Nigeria when oil prices

plummeted and governmental instability increased. 8

S. Ricca, Migrations internationals en Afrique (Paris: L Harmattan, 1990).

Anderanti Andepoju, Regional Integration, Continuity and Changing Patterns of Intra-Regional

Migration in Sub-Saharan Afirca, in M.A.B. Siddique, ed., International Migration into the 21st Century

(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001).

Few recall today that a mass repatriation of Mexicans living in the U nited States

occurred in the 1930s and that Operation Wetback in 1954 resulted in the manu militari

deportation of one million Mexicans. Mexican apprehensiveness over interpretation of

President George W. Bush s interview with the Copely News Service in March 2003, in

this respect, does not appear unwarranted. Regional integration within NAFTA does

not ensure an outcome similar to freedom of movement for European citizens.

Are there other Possible Re ferents for NAFTA?

The cases of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece in European regional integration seem

germane when contemplating possible European referents for NAFTA. Instead of

focusing on the extension of freedom of movement to Italian workers under Article 48,

which came grudgingly and, for the Italian government, belatedly, Mexico and the

United States would do well to focus on how European Community investments in

infrastructure and development in the Mezzogiorno helped attenuate international

migration. Instead of haggling over expanded admissions of temporary Mexican

workers to the United States, which after all would signify a regression to a much-

decried bracero policy, would not it make more sense for the United States and Mexico

to focus on infrastructural investments likely to foster Mexico s socio-economic

development?

Foreign assistance has a bad reputation within the Beltway and most U.S.

citizens have very mistaken notions about how much foreign aid the United States

provides. Undoubtedly, some of the hostility to U.S. foreign assistance arises from the

way that it has been allocated in recent years- mainly to Israel and Egypt and much of it

in the form of military and tied assistance. Public opinion polling, however,

consistently finds the general public to be supportive of generous US foreign assistance.

The George W. Bush administration s rejection of Kofi Annan s initiative at Monterey

thus amounted to a classic volte-face. However the grudging acceptance by the

Administration to increase U.S. foreign aid as part of a global strategy to alleviate the

roots of terrorism may signal an impor tant departure.9

Spain, Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Greece also might be viewed as referents.

Spain and Portugal underwent a remarkable transition from lands of emigration to lands

of immigration during the period that roughly coincided with their accession to full

membership. The prospect of Iberian membership prompted a debate eerily reminiscent

of the 2000-2001 debate over the migratory consequences of Poland s entry into the

EU.10 Some feared a tidal wave of Spanish and Portuguese emigration to other EU

member-states after the completion of the transition period. More lucid voices pointed

to the lessons of the Italian precedent and, it turned out, they were right. Spain and

Portugal retained huge expatriate populations in the aftermath of full membership but no

tidal wave of new Spanish and Portuguese community workers materialized. To

paraphrase Ray Koslowski, intra-European capital mobility substituted for intra-

European labor mobility. 11 Between the onset of negotiations over Iberian accession

and completion of the transition period, Spain and Portugal underwent a significant

B. Crossette, Annan says Terrorism Roots are Broader than Poverty, New York Times, March 7, 2002.

E. H nekopp and H. Werner, Is the EU s Labour Market Threatened by a Wave of Immigration?

Intereconomics, January 1, February, 3-8, 2000.

Koslowski, p. 17.

socio-economic transformation, linked in large part to the prospect of EU membership.

Changing Iberian demographic realities also helped foster change. Spain in particular

underwent a migration transition in the 1980s and 1990s that was roughly analogous to

the migration transition in Italy in the 1970s.

There are indications that Mexico has begun to undergo migration transition.

Most migration to Mexico remains transit migration. But migrant populations have

long contributed to the labor force of certain regions of Mexico, such as Chiapas, and

recent legalization policies undertaken by the Mexican government acknowledged an

insufficiently understood aspect of Mexican society.

Mexico s status as a land of both emigration, transit migration and of

immigration is far from unusual, indeed such status is increasingly the global norm.

Recognition of that multi-faceted reality has become a more important factor in U.S.-

Mexico dialogue over migration issues in the wake of September 11. Some have called

for a hemispheric or at least NAFTA area defense perimeter in which immigration

policies are harmonized in a way analogous to on-going EU efforts to negotiate a

common immigration policy. Mexico apparently has sought to link its cooperation with

such a strategy to U.S. initiatives concerning illegally resident Mexicans in the United

States.

Leaving aside Portugal and Greece for reasons of parsimony, Spain s

incorporation into the Schengen space constituted a sine qua non for its accession. As

soon as Schengen rules applied, notably the imposition of visa requirements on

Moroccans, the first pateras transporting illegal Moroccans and Black Africans arrived

on Spain s coasts. In the 1990s, migratory pressures upon Spain appeared to intensify,

perhaps spurred on by Spain s recurrent legalization policies and authorization of small-

scale temporary foreign worker recruitment. By late 2001, an association representing

Moroccans in Spain estimated that some 4,000 Moroccans alone had perished seeking

to enter Spain in the previous five years. Such figures, of course, are notoriously

difficult to substantiate but they provide some measure of the passion evoked by Spain s

immigration dilemmas in recent years. 12 The currently ruling conservative government

has subsequently repudiated legalization policy and has infuriated Morocco with its

proposals adopted at the Tampere EU summit, which seek to encourage Morocco to

impose visa requirements on many Sub-Saharan African countries in order to stem

transit migration through Morocco to Spain.

There is much for both Mexicans and Americans to mull over on the possible

referent to Spain. In terms of much analyzed specific policies that have been endlessly

debated in the U.S.-Mexico context, recent experiences in Spain seem to confirm the

conventional wisdom. Legalization policies offer humanitarian relief to illegally

resident aliens but do nothing to alter illegal migration dynamics. 13 Indeed, they

probably serve to attract additional illegal migration. Temporary foreign worker

admissions policies are difficult to administer and often become back door

legalization policies and probably also serve to increase illegal migration. The United

A. Belguendouz, La Dimension Migratoire Maroco -Hispano-Europ enne: Quelle Cooperation? in A

New Security Agenda for Future Regional Co-operation in the Mediterranean Region (Rome: Fourth

Mediterranean Dialogue International Research Seminar, NATO Defense College, November 2001).

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Combating the Illegal Employment

of Foreign Workers (Paris: OECD, 2000).

S tates and Mexico should examine specific instruments or policies implemented by

Spain very closely, because these policies appear to have aggravated rather than

alleviated illegal migration.

The germaneness of Morocco, and by extension Tunisia and Algeria, to NAFTA

zone migration policy is suggested by commonplace reference to the partnership

agreements of recent years as EU mini-NAFTA pacts. Indeed, the signature of NAFTA

appears to have had what Reinhard Bendix termed a demonstration effect upon the

EU and its North African partners. The partnership agreements created free trade areas

and foresaw cooperation on migration policies matters, particularly to reduce illegal

migration.

Morocco had a long track record of cooperation with European states,

particularly with France, on bilateral migration matters. Despite the partnership pact

with the EU, Moroccan-Spain and Moroccan-EU tensions have increased. Migration

regulation is only one of several fractious issues, but it may be the most significant.

Interestingly, Morocco has come to embrace notions that closely parallel Mexico s

official views in bilateral negotiations with the United States over Mexican migration.

Specifically, Morocco views illegal emigration to the EU space as labor market-driven,

essentially a response to unmet employer demand. EU member-states such as Spain,

like the United States, view illegal migration as violations of law. Morocco regards

migrant integration and initiatives against discrimination as priorities for Spain and the

EU, not prevention of illegal migration.

The worsening state of Morocco-EU relations in recent years seems to contrast

sharply with the direction of U.S.-Mexico relations. But appearances can be deceiving

and the historically antagonistic U .S.-Mexico relationship, particularly over bilateral

migration issues, may well resume as the afterglow of the honeymoon period fades. For

all the transatlantic contextual differences, Morocco and Mexico find themselves in

quite analogous situations. The likely effects of the partnership agreements upon

emigration from North Africa will probably parallel the migration hump foreseen for

migration in the U.S.-Mexico trade liberalization scenario. 14

Turkey s relationship to European regional integration differs greatly from that

of North African countries. Turkey acceded to EC association status in 1972, a step

then understood as foreshadowing eventual full membership. Turkish citizens comprise

the largest population of third country nationals within the EU space, totaling over three

million, with the more than two million Moroccans in the EU next in line. Turkey now

comprises a customs union with the EU but has repeatedly seen its bids for full

membership in the EU rebuffed despite strong U.S. pressure upon EU member-states in

support of Turkey s accession. Long-standing U.S. support for Turkey s full

membership has complicated U.S.-EU relations and amounts, as Joaqu n Roy has

suggested, to U.S. meddling in the internal affairs of the European Union.

The U.S. advocacy ignores a multitude of problems and issues which stand in

the way of Turkish full membership. There is no need here to elaborate upon those

many problems and issues as they have been ably analyzed elsewhere.15 Suffice it to

G. White, Encouraging Unwanted Immigration: A Political Economy of Europe s Efforts to

Discourage North African Immigration, Third World Quarterly, 20:4, 1999.

B. Buzan and T. Diez, The European Union and Turkey, Survival, Vol. 41, Spring 1999.

note here that a key dimension of the bundle of problems and issues standing in the way

is the prospect for unacceptably high levels of Turkish emigration after the completion

of a transition period. Such a scenario is politically unpalatable to most EU member

states despite the looming demographic declines in countries like Germany, Spain and

Italy. This constitutes a key reason why the horizon for Turkey s full membership

remains remote and distant but still possible.

Currently, Turkey like Morocco is coming under considerable pressure to

harmonize its immigration policies with those of the EU. For instance, Turkey s

refugee law and policy recently changed with Turkey discontinuing the long established

practice of granting preferential entry to ethnic Turks from former Ottoman lands.

Turkey is also contemplating imposition of employer sanctions and reform of its

policies towards asylum seekers. 16 These proposed changes could be quite significant

as Turkey has long tolerated the presence of three to four million aliens, most of whom

hail from nearby countries like Iran and Iraq. If Turkey were to alter its de facto policy

of toleration, and thereby more closely approximate public policies in the EU area, there

could be significant repercussions upon a region already confronting politically

destabilizing population movements, such as the massive inflow of Iraqis to Jordan.

Turkey s relationship to the EU somewhat parallels Mexico s to the United

States, although the former involves a customs union while the latter a free trade

agreement. In both instances, the legacy of past temporary foreign worker recruitment

policies weighs heavily. That legacy mitigates against full membership for Turkey in

the EU, turning on its head the unwarranted assumption that worker migration

necessarily leads to deeper socioeconomic and political integration.

Mexico continues to seek expanded admission of its citizens as temporary

workers in the US and apparently would regard a return to bracero -like policy as

progress in the U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship. But the bracero policy was

terminated in 1964 for good reasons just as were guest worker policies in the 1972 to

1974 period in Western Europe. Temporary foreign worker recruitment policies in

Europe and North America constituted flawed public policies that resulted in

considerable unanticipated settlement and illegal migration. There is no good reason to

think that expanded admissions of temporary foreign workers from Mexico to the

United States is going to hasten the day that President Fox s vision of a border -free

North America arrives. The track record of temporary foreign worker admissions

policies contributing to harmonious bilateral or regional relations is unpromising.

Turkey, thus, may constitute a more relevant European referent for NAFTA. As

long as Turkey lags far behind the EU economically and long-term prospects for high

rates of Turkish emigration remain, deeper integration with the EU through full

membership will prove elusive. When guest worker policies in Western Eur ope were

curbed or stopped in the early 1970s, several million Turks were registered for

recruitment. 17 Some thirty years later, full membership for Turkey in the EU remains

elusive, in part because of the perception that too many Turks would emigrate if granted

freedom of labor mobility within the EU.

OECD, Trends in International Migration (Paris: OECD, 2001), p. 254.

Comparing Labor M igration within NAFTA and the EU: A Research Agenda

There have been a number of efforts to compare the European and North American

migratory systems, and policy-oriented transatlantic compa risons of international

migration stretch back to the mid-1970s, if not earlier. Yet important misapprehensions

persist as attested to by unwarranted allusions to a European referent to NAFTA in the

U.S.-Mexico immigration honeymoon period. This suggests that much more work

needs to be done by all concerned parties, including Americans.

Migration issues can no longer be dismissed as peripheral or esoteric. They

vitally affect security, inclusive of that of migrants. The U nited States does not seem to

appreciate fully how European security concerns are related to the prevention of

unwanted migration. Transatlantic tensions over Iraq arise, in part, from differing

perceptions of security threats. The EU wants to stabilize the Middle East, the source o f

so much immigration to the EU. It understands that a likely consequence of further

conflict in the Middle East will be greater pressure for emigration to the EU.

The United States appears oblivious to the fears of its European allies, inclusive

of Turkey. Indeed, it appears to view the war with Iraq as possibly resulting in regime

change and democratization. It courts elements of the approximately four million

expatriate Iraqis, out of a total population of some twenty-two million, to help bring

about democratization.

Meanwhile, Arab scholars and leaders warn of a war opening the proverbial jaws

of hell. Mass movement of people appears to figure centrally in this apocalyptic vision.

Surely it is high time for transatlantic comparisons of immigration and migration

policies to take their implications for security seriously, especially if war with Iraq

increases the appeal of al-Qaida amongst Muslims in the transatlantic area, as seems

predictable.

P.L. Martin, The Unfinished Story, Turkish Labour Migration to Western Europe (Geneva:

International Labour Organization, 1991).

References

Anderanti Andepoju, Regional Integration, Continuity and Changing Patterns of Intra-Regional

Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa, in M.A.B. Siddique, ed., International Migration

into the 21st Century, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001).

Belguendouz, A. (2001) La Dimension Migratoire Maroco-Hispano-Europ enne: Quelle

Cooperation? in A New Security Agenda for Future Regional Co-operation in the

Mediterranean Region (Rome: Fourth Mediterranean Dialogue International Research

Seminar, NATO Defense College) November 2001.

Buzan, B. and Diez, T. (1999) The European Union and Turkey, Survival, Vol. 41 (Spring).

Crossette, B. (2002a) Annan says Terrorism Roots are Broader than Poverty, New York

Times, March 7, 2002.

Geddes, A. (2000) Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe?

(Manchester and NY: Manchester University Press).

H nekopp, E. and Werner, H. (2000) Is the EU s Labour Market Threatened by a Wave of

Immigration?, Intereconomics, January 1, February, 3-8.

Koslowski, R. (2000) Migrants and Citizens (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).

Martin, P.L. (1993) Trade ad Migration: NAFTA and Agriculture (Washington, DC: Institute

for International Economics).

Martin. P.L. (1991) The Unfinished Story, Turkish Labour Migration to Western Europe

(Geneva: ILO).

Martin, P.L. and Taylor, J.E. (2001) Managing Migration: The Role of Economic Policies, in

A. Zolberg and P. Benda, Global Migrants, Global Refugees (NY: Berghahn Books).

OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) (2000) Combating the

Illegal Employment of Foreign Workers (Paris: OECD).

OECD (2001) Trends in International Migration (Paris: OECD).

Ricca, S. (1990) Migrations internationales en Afrique (Paris: L Harmattan).

Romero, F. (1993) Migration as an issue in European interdependence and integration: The

case of Italy, in A. Milward, F. Lynch, R. Ranieri, F. Romero and V. S renson (eds.),

The Frontier of National Sovereignty (London: Routledge).

Werner, H. (1973) Freiz gigkeit der Arbeitskr fte und die Wanderungsbewegungen in den

L ndern der Europ ischen Gemeinschaft (Nuremburg: Institut f r Arbeitsmarkt-und

Berufsforschung).

White, G. (1999) Encouraging Unwanted Immigration: A Political Economy of Europe s

Efforts to Discourage North African Immigration, Third World Quarterly, 20:4.

Contact this candidate