J.Perry Johnson

Email: abqrl7@r.postjobfree.com

Address: *** ******* ***** ****

City: Alpharetta

State: GA

Zip: 30004

Country: USA

Phone: 770-***-****

Skill Level: Senior

Salary Range: $225,000

Willing to Relocate

Primary Skills/Experience:

See Resume

Educational Background:

See Resume

Job History / Details:

Executive Resume

J. Perry Johnson

715 Hampton Trace Lane Alpharetta, Georgia 30004

Phone: 770-***-**** Email: abqrl7@r.postjobfree.com

Professional Resume at:

Leadership Profile

Investment Business Development, Investment Management, Asset Allocation, Investment Process Design, Absolute and Relative Returns, Risk Budgeting/Alpha Modeling, Multi-Asset Class Expertise

Outstanding track record of leadership in driving the growth of investment assets under management and implementing state-of-the-art investment strategies to generate a high rate of return for clients. Built two investment organizations that grew from zero to managing $2.1 and $4.5 billion dollars respectively. Global recognition for developing top-down and bottom-up investment processes, building peak performance investment teams, and maximizing returns for investors. Unique expertise in utilizing quantitative investment and internal risk budgeting techniques. Adept at evaluating cyclical and secular forces that impact global asset pricing. Developed alpha modeling techniques and constructed portable alpha modeling strategies for clients worldwide. Exceptional ability to create internal and external strategic partnerships to leverage investment opportunities. Drove assets under management from zero to approximately $5 billion in 2005 at Invesco. The Invesco strategy has since grown to $17 billion in 2012, through strategic partnerships and effective portfolio management as illustrated in following graph.

Professional Experience

BME Investment Partners

Atlanta, GA

Chief Investment Officer and Chief Executive Officer

2006 to 2012

Directed the business development, investment strategies, and internal operations of the organization. Developed a fully integrated and automated investment, trading and risk management operation in collaboration with his investment team. This start-up company had over $ 2.1billion in assets under management secured over a two year span. Designed one of the first multi-horizon, top-down investment models. The process had three horizons that were secular, cyclical and market based.

J. Perry Johnson Page 2

Through a team effort, generated and implemented the investment strategies for over $2.1 billion in assets from previous and new client relationships. The success in asset gathering was based on three pillars: 1)

investment performance track record and business relationships developed at Invesco, 2) the level of sophistication of the investment platform, and 3) the team`s ability to serve as a strategic partner with clients.

At BME, the team conceptualized and developed one of the first multi-horizon investment models that was expanded to allow for multi-horizon influences. For example, the relative return forecast for the secular model (three to five year forecast) included valuation and whether an economy was over or under-spent. If an economy was over-spent, it meant that the growth outlook would be below average, which, in turn, lowered forward earnings and equity returns. These plus the secular outlook for inflation were the primary determinants of long-term returns. The cyclical model included changes in monetary policy, relative unit labor cost, and other intermediate -term determinants of relative cash flow and thus relative performance. The market based component was near-term cash-flow proxies based on information observed in market prices. Multi-horizon modeling added value in two ways. First, it provided for enhanced alpha diversification within and across each investment model. Secondly, it quantified and promoted a greater understanding of the drivers of relative performance. These enhancements allowed us to more effectively control risk and provided clients with valuable insights into their own internal investment framework.

The strategic partnership program was critical to BME`s marketing success. Initially, BME was hired by two marquee clients with plan assets in the $25 to $100 billion range. In addition to managing money, one of the clients hired BME to assist them with their internal model development while the other wanted the team to help them with strategic asset allocation decisions, manager research, risk budgeting, and hedge fund structure. BME developed a manager review and selection platform that sought to promote an understanding of their managers` cycles and alpha stability.

Invesco

Atlanta, GA

Global Partner, COO, CIO, Multi-Asset Strategies

1997 to 2005

Directed the development of a multi-asset, multi-manager capability to serve the firms larger/more sophisticated clients. The team designed a top-down, valuation and dynamic process that provided an information ratio above 1.0. Generated over $5 billion dollars in new assets over two years to launch the business within Invesco. The business ultimately grew to a $17 billion business within the Invesco family.

Built a local, global top-down investment process that supported CIO's in every region globally. The process quantified the relative attractiveness of every stock, bond and currency market globally. The process was truly global in nature and could be adapted to any local, market perspective. The modeling allowed for intra-market (small/large, sector, i.e.) strategies and provided for across market perspectives.

The tactical asset allocation process was based on valuation and dynamics. Long-term, normalized cash flow established whether an asset was cheap or expensive, while near-term cash flow determined the reversion speed of prices toward equilibrium. It was a major advancement over traditional valuation only tactical processes.

Within the multi-asset group, a strategic partnership program was developed to serve Invesco`s larger, more sophisticated clients with the objective of improving their internal, investment process. It assisted clients with strategic asset allocation decisions, tactical asset allocation modeling, risk budgeting methodologies, manager selection and evaluation, portable alpha strategies, and hedge fund manager selection and structures. The strategic partnership program was central to growing assets under management and retaining clients.

J. Perry Johnson Page 3

Brinson Partners

Chicago, IL

Partner, Client Service

1993 to 1996

Provided client service to 45 institutional clients and helped the firm maintain a high client retention ratio in a difficult market for value managers. Utilizing investment and communication strategies he trained members of the team in business development and client retention concepts. Served as a key member of the Global Asset Allocation, US Fixed Income and International Equity Investment Committees.

Brinson Partners was a value manager; and, thus, they began to underperform during the growth style boom in the mid-to-late 1990s. During this period, not only did Perry not lose any clients, he also won over $1.5 billion in new business.

From 1990 through 1993, the US fixed income operation had not won any new business. The CIO asked Perry to work with the Head of US Fixed Income to chart a course forward. Over a 2.5 year span Brinson raised over $4.5 billion in assets.

When the performance of non-US equities had fallen from the first quartile to the bottom quartile, Perry was selected to develop a strategy for business retention. Performance had turned down due to a yen short position that had continued to build over time. Simply stated, the yen strength was not sustainable. The analysis helped clients understand why the disequilibria was unsustainable which helped stabilize the client base, helped Brinson raise additional assets during a period of underperformance, and enabled Perry to defend the product line.

Watson Wyatt

Atlanta, GA

Director of Investment Consulting

1996 to 1997

1992 to 1993

Managed the investment consulting practices for the Southeast and Southwest regions. Stabilized the client base and added over 15 new accounts over a 2.5 year span. Oversaw the development of investment policy, asset/liability studies, manager research and evaluation for all clients in said regions. Instrumental in developing a risk based investment approach to consulting that improved benchmark and manager structural design.

Selected to secure key client relationships that were in jeopardy. Wyatt's largest client had scheduled termination at year's end. At the trustees' conference, value-added processes and procedures were presented. After the conference, the committee reversed their decision and voted to retain Wyatt. This preserved the profitability of the region.

Developed a value-added consulting proposition to be used throughout Wyatt. The premise was based on the notion that risk is the decay of compound returns. Thus, if risk was managed efficiently, the compound returning power of any investment structure would increase. The process lead to a number of strategies that added incremental value to clients over time: 1) Smart rebalancing techniques for asset classes and managers, 2) Risk budgeting techniques for benchmark design and manager alpha diversification, 3) asset allocation techniques for managing surplus volatility, and 4) alpha modeling (in terms of cycles) of managers.

The updated consulting techniques helped secure over $2.0 billion in new consulting assets in the first six months of his tenor which increased profitability by 35% for the region.

Prior to 1992, served in positions of increasing levels of responsibility and was consistently recognized for achieving a track record of investment management success within the following organizations: Investment Performance Services, Prudential Bach Securities, and Hercules, Inc.

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Education

M.A.C.C., Masters of Accounting, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 1981

B.B.A., Accounting University of Georgia, Athens GA 1979

Continued Education/Professional Development

Certified Financial Analyst (CFA)

Certified Public Accountant (CPA), State of Georgia

Specialized Skills

Fundamental and quantitative investment process design.

Strategic and tactical asset allocation.

Multi-Asset Class expertise

US, Non-US equities, and emerging equities

Developed and emerging bond markets.

Active currency management, developed and emerging

Top-down and bottom-up equity selection.

Risk Budgeting and Alpha Modeling.

Economic forecasting.

Absolute and relative return management.

Strategic planning.

Team building and development.

Publications

One of Four people globally invited to study the privatization of social security for CIEBA, the Treasury Department and Social Security Administration.

Beyond 2013, Cash will be King, January, 2013.

Why the Euro will Fail, Invesco 1998.

Accomplishments

Develop Valuation and Dynamic Investment Process at Invesco:

Situation:

At Brinson Partners, the investment process was valuation centric. That is, the only tool utilized in the investment approach was whether the investment opportunity was over or undervalued. While the process worked over the long-term (3-10 years), we continually got caught in valuation traps. We would buy an asset that was undervalued and simply watch it decline for extended periods of time. The only defense utilized to improve performance in these circumstances was to increase the size of the bet in hopes that prices would rebound. At times this resulted in extreme underperformance, creating client discomfort.

Action Plan:

* We observed that, while Brinson`s valuation only process was fundamentally intuitive, it was prone to excessive drawdowns that dramatically effected performance.

* We first confirmed that long-term, normalized cash flows established the central tendency of prices and, thus, was a good proxy for fair value estimates.

* In observing the cyclical movement of prices around the long-term, normalized trend in earnings, we found the deviation in prices around said trend was often dramatic. Further, we concluded prices often followed the cyclical nature of earnings around the normalized trend. Thus, if an asset was undervalued, and its earnings continued to fall, the asset tended to get more undervalued. This was the primary reason for the valuation traps that resulted in dramatic underperformance.

* Once the issue was understood, we then had to identity the drivers of cyclical earnings away from equilibrium. We termed the cyclical drivers of relative cashflows as dynamics. From a high level, there were two primary variables, relative margins and relative growth.

* For each market globally, the cyclical drivers (dynamics) of relative growth and relative margins were identified to chart the relative earnings or relative cash flow outlook.

* Valuation and dynamics were then combined into a single model. Long-term relative cash flow established whether an asset was cheap or expensive, while dynamics (or the drivers of the near-term relative cash flows) addressed the revision speed of prices toward equilibrium.

Results:

By combining valuation and dynamics into a single model, the information ratio of the global tactical asset allocation process was improved from .45 at Brinson to above 1.0 at Invesco. The techniques utilized were seen as innovative and insightful by prospective clients. Valuation identified the return opportunity; however, dynamics helped us understand when the mispricing could be captured.

Implementation of Alpha Porting and Alpha Stacking Investment Strategies

Situation:

A large institutional client was concerned about their ability to meet their long-term investment objectives. The client asked the Invesco team to develop alternatives to traditional assets and hedge funds to meet their required return hurdle. Attempts were made to enhance returns by changing their asset mix, but the results were not encouraging. It was clear an alternative must be developed.

Action Plan:

* Utilizing our equilibrium and secular asset class return forecast, it was clear the client could not meet their return target with beta alone.

* A risk budget was prepared which showed 96% of the plan`s risk was coming from beta and only 4% was related to alpha. The client decided to materially increase its risk to alpha.

* To help the client meet its objective, an enhanced investment structure was needed to monitor and control the risk of higher tracking error alpha strategies and or benchmark structures.

* The process sought to cleanly separate the source of returns for traditional and hedge fund managers into alpha and beta.

* The goal was to port multiple layers of stable alpha sources onto the traditional beta components of the portfolio and assure risks were not being compounded within both the alpha and beta components.

* Modeling techniques were designed to understand the cycle of each manager`s return. The cycle of the alphas were modeled and the beta components were linked to our top-down secular views. This allowed the client to better understand when a manager would outperform, underperform, why, and where they were in their investment cycle.

Results:

The net result was threefold. First, by separating alpha from beta for each manager, we were better able to budget risk without compounding bets in the alpha and beta structures. Since the client was better able to understand the risk taken, they were more willing to take incremental risk in an effort to achieve their return target.

Secondly, by developing an alpha modeling technique, the client was able to understand and observe manager cycles. By knowing when a manager would outperform or underperform, the clients avoided the temptation of hiring managers at the top and selling them at the bottom of their respective investment cycles. The process also lead to a reduction in the number of managers needed which reduced management fees.

Thirdly, these techniques were utilized both externally and internally at Invesco. The CEO of Invesco utilized our insights to make more effective business decisions when determining whether to buy, merge or close investment operations within the broader Amvesap Family.

Industry Insights

Beyond 2013, Cash will be King

Today`s investment environment is uniquely challenging. With the decline in interest rates, liabilities have exploded. Active managers are struggling to outperform their benchmarks and equities are flat since 1999. The question ahead is how to set investment strategy going forward. Do we rely on what has worked over the last 30 to 40 years; or do we look to the future, as cloudy as it may be, and try to glean a speck of knowledge and press forward

In the years ahead, we expect a major unwinding of the global debt cycle which will push stocks, bonds, and commodities and real estate to extreme lows. The crowd will look back and say, -How could we have known

- -Investment Leaders will move away from the pact and will encourage clients to have cash on hand. This will allow clients to buy assets for cents on the dollar. Investment leaders will design new investment strategies and products that will preserve capital and add alpha in new and unique ways.

What Has Changed

Since 2008, we have had a bull market in commodities, bonds and equities. From past experience we know this will not hold. Historically, a bull market in commodities leads to a bear market in bonds, or, visa versa. Further, from a long-term, historical perspective, the correlation between stocks and bond yields has been decidedly negative. That is, as interest rates fall stock prices rise; or, as interest rates rise, stock prices should fall. Yet, from 2000 to 2012 the relationship has turned markedly positive. With these historical incongruities, what is the market telling us, and what are the implications for the future

What are the markets telling us

First, this is not a normal, business cycle recession. It is a long-term credit cycle recession. Since 1950, the US has not experienced a true -credit-cleansing cycle-. As a result, our non-financial debt to GDP ratio (1) has continued to climb from 130% in 1950 to 360% today (2). As a base-line of comparison, debt to GDP in the US was 156 percent in 1875 and rose to 300% in 1933, a frightening statistic. Yet, if the problem was solely a US concern, the path forward would be more simplistic/optimistic. However, the Eurozone`s debt to GDP is near 450%; and, Japan`s is as well (3). In other words, this is a global issue, the proportions of which have never been seen in history. Central banks are desperately trying to prop-up the system; but, the chinks in the armor run too deep. In the next down-turn, the long awaited end of the debt super-cycle will begin in earnest.

What is an investor to do today

So what is an investor to do

Near-term, with unemployment falling in the US and the housing market improving, growth should accelerate toward 3.0% by the end of 2013. Also, the Chinese economy appears to be rebounding as well. Infrastructure spending is accelerating, manufacturing PMI`s are rising, and broad money and bank loans have all strengthened. Given an improving cyclical backdrop, use any near-term pull-back in equities to increase your exposure. We fully expect the S&P 500 to reach 1600 before the current cyclical bull market ends.

What are the implications for the future

Given the oddity of the current bull market in bonds, equities, and commodities, it is clear correlations have turned decidedly positive across asset markets. At the end the current expansion, therefore, the worse portfolio will be a diversified portfolio. As the market approaches 1600, go to cash, get out of debt and select some high risk strategies that offer exceptionally high returns. Keep the powder dry, you will be able to buy these assets for cents on the dollar. Once excess debt is rung out of the system, the greatest bull market in financial history will begin. However, only those with cash on hand will have the resources to participate.

What should we be advising clients to do

Form a pension fund or foundation and endowment perspective, benchmarks should be redesigned to protect in the coming bear-market. Historical optimization techniques that promote global diversification will not work over the next 10 years. Benchmarks should be designed that have a much lower beta to bond, equity, and commodity markets. Risk budgets should be designed that place substantially more risk on alpha, as opposed to beta. In other

words, clients need to discontinue diversity investment strategies. They need fewer managers and alpha sources that are fully understood and quantifiable. Beta strategies should be targeted toward the liability structure, but that will outperform in a bear-market. Only asset classes that better match the liabilities or that offer meaningful return opportunities should be considered for the next down turn.

What are the products of the future

The products of the future will be those that provide yield, down market protection, alpha, or long-term returns that are attractive enough to cause one to weather the coming storm. The -all weather portfolio- of the past will be the wealth destroyer of the future because they are based on the premise that diversification wins over time. Investment processes, whether they are alpha or beta centric should be designed based mostly on long-term sustainable return potential. Yes, near-term dynamics and technicals have proved helpful and may help one gradually shift into a more defensive strategy. However, trend following is so prevalent today; my guess is that when the fire starts only a lucky few will be able to exit the party.

Processes need to be put in place to fully separate alpha and beta within hedge fund and traditional strategies. If we shift to a alpha centric strategy clients mush know and quantify the bets they are taking. Secondly, the cycle of the alpha and beta exposures should be fully quantified and understood in the context of the long-term drivers. If a manager provides alpha, and it is not clear as to its source, and/or, its cycle of performance, it should not be in the structure at all, or only in small proportions. The winners of the cycle ahead will be those that are bold enough to step forward, and put in simple, fully understandable (in terms of forward return potential and cycle of performance) alpha and beta structures. Product should not be diversified, but rather targeted with an eye toward to future.

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